Bio-politics, Transspecies Love and/as Class Commons-Sense Jennifer Cotter ONE As class contradictions have grown sharper with
intensification of the crisis of profitability in global capitalism,
cultural theory in the North Atlantic retreats further and further into
spiritual explanations and resolutions of material
contradictions. Yet, rather than confronting the relationship of
increasing exploitation and, therefore, poverty of workers around the
world, the concentration of wealth into fewer hands, sharp increases in
unemployment and economic insecurity, the commodification of all aspects
of "life" subordinating them to production for profit, and the
sharpening alienation of workers to class relations founded on
exploitation in production, contemporary cultural theory is
retreating away from the social, the historical, and the material
basis of these questions in production relations to "immaterial,"
"affective" and "spiritual" resolutions of material contradictions and
ideologically translating capitalism and exploitation into existential
conditions of "life" as such. It is in this context that cultural theory in the
global North has embraced what Christian Marazzi calls "the biopolitical
turn of the economy"—an increasing turn to "bio-politics" as a means to
explain and address the social and economic contradictions in capitalism
now (as qtd. in Corsani 107). At the core of "bio-political" theory is
a substitution of "life"—particularly the spiritualist concept of
a creative "life-force" or what Henri Bergson calls elan vital—for
the historical and material relations of the dialectical praxis of
labor and class as explanations of the material basis of
contradictions in capitalism now and their transformation. In other
words, at the core of biopolitics is a cultural spiritualism which
ideologically translates historical and material relations into a
transhistorical and autonomous power of life—a mystical vitalism—and
posits this spiritual vitalism as the basis of bringing about new social
relations. This new "spiritualism" of life is offered in a variety of
articulations in contemporary cultural theory from the writings that
overtly address theories of "biopower" and "biopolitics" as in the
writings of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (Commonwealth),
Giorgio Agamben (Homo Sacer), Maurizio Lazzarato, and Antonella
Corsani, among others, to the transspecies posthumanist writings of
Derrida (The Animal That Therefore I Am), Agamben (The Open),
and Donna Haraway (When Species Meet). These biopolitical
theories claim to address a range of material problems that are the
effect of production for profit in capitalism while at the same time
abstracting these problems from their origins in class relations and
exploitation: from the encroachment of commodity relations into all
aspects of life, including the private ownership of strands of DNA and
whole species of plants and animals; to the degradation of the
environment in the interests of profit; to economic crisis; to the
extension of the working day; to the subordination of love and sexuality
to production for profit; to the estrangement of workers from social
wealth... In place of addressing the material conditions and
relations that have given rise to these problems, however, bio-political
theories posit an "other-world" and an "other-worldly life"—a
concept of spiritual life that is prior to, constitutive of,
transcendent of and/or outside of the historical and social relations of
capitalism—as the basis of a new "commons" beyond the material
contradictions of capitalism. The spiritualization of life in biopolitical theories,
to be clear, is represented as a new form of materialism. The
substitution of "life" for "class" in bio-political theories draws from
Foucault’s theory of "bio-power" in which he argues that "modern man is
an animal whose politics calls his existence as a living being into
question" (The History of Sexuality Vol 1 143). "Bio-power,"
Foucault contends, is a regime of power that, rather than ruling by
threat of death, produces life through the disciplining of bodies, the
regulation of populations, and through the "technologies of the self" in
which bodies come to bind themselves to identities produced through
sovereign power. In fact, Foucault posits "bio-power"—the instrumental
disciplining of bodies such that they come to experience their own
subjection as the norm of life and source of pleasure—rather than the
exploitation of labor as the material basis of capitalism. Capitalism,
Foucault contends, is not possible without "bio-power": "bio-power was
without question an indispensable element in the development of
capitalism; the latter would not have been possible without the
controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production"
(140-141). According to Foucault, "There is no binary and all
encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of power
relations" (94). In this view there is "no regulative mechanism" of
power relations. Instead, in Foucault’s cultural imaginary of power,
"power is everywhere ... because it comes from everywhere" (93). In this narrative, an explanatory critique of "power"
as the effect of class relations of capitalism—relations between
exploiter and exploited—is part of a "binary metaphysics" of power which
discursively imposes a regime of truth (power/knowledge) onto what is
"actually," so the story goes, an ineffably and mysteriously plural,
diffuse, and amorphous "multiplicity of forces." On the one hand, "life"
is assumed to spontaneously produce a discursive proliferation of
meanings (knowledges) that then discipline and contain it. On the other
hand, life is regarded as an ineffable and plural opacity that "resists"
all conceptual explanation. The subjection of bodies is reduced to a
contingent, "spontaneous" and aleatory effect of "life" as such
or the sheer fact of living. This makes it appear as if "power over
life" comes not from structural relations relations of exploitation, but
from a non-structural, amorphous, cultural plurality—a cultural
democracy of "power from below" to which all have access by virtue of
living—that is "everywhere." Foucault’s theory of "bio-power" is not a form of
materialism but a form of cultural spiritualism. When Foucault argues
that "bio-politics" is at the root of capitalism, he dehistoricizes "the
machinery of production" into which he claims bodies are "inserted." The
existence of "the machinery of production"—or a "controlled insertion"
of bodies—is itself the effect of the dialectical praxis of labor. This
is because power is not an autonomous, trans-historical life force nor
is it an ineffable diffuse plurality beyond historical and conceptual
explanation, but an effect of definite historical and material
conditions and relations. Power, in other words, rests upon material
conditions of production. Whether or not the society has the
"power" to end starvation or to condemn the majority of the laboring
population to a lifetime of starvation, has to do with the level of
development of its material conditions of production—its forces of
production—and the social relations of production (the labor and
property relations) that determine the social ends and interests toward
which labor is put. This is another way of saying that power is the
historical and material effect of labor in the form of property. In a
society in which property is privately owned, power is the capacity of
the ruling class to "command over the surplus-labor" of workers in
production (The German Ideology 102). At the root of power
relations is an antagonistic class relation: the antagonism between
owners of the means of production and workers who only own their labor
to sell in order to survive and are exploited. The binary of class, to
be clear, is historical and material not, at root, discursive: class
binaries are not the effect of nature, god, nor are they the effect of
"western metaphysics," "discursive construction," "binary thinking," or
conceptualization, but the effect of private ownership of the means
of production.
Foucault’s theory of power does the ideological work
of capital by concealing and ideologically inverting the structural
relations of class in capitalism. In place of the material
transformation of structural relations of capitalism, Foucault advocates
"resistance" within—a change in the discursive and cultural regimes and
a re-valuing of "life"—as the basis of a "different economy of bodies
and pleasures" (159). This amounts to the the updating of the culture of
capitalism as the limit of change while the needs of the masses for
material abolition of exploitation is dismissed as a reactionary
nostalgia for the impossible—what Foucault dismisses as "The ‘right’ to
life ... beyond all the oppressions" (145). Changing the cultural values
of life and regarding this as constituting material change—i.e.,
as an end in itself—becomes a means to ideologically update power
relations without fundamentally transforming them. The spiritualism that is implicit in Foucault’s theory
of "bio-power" has become more pronounced in contemporary articulations
of biopolitics. In their most recent book, Commonwealth, for
example, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri put forward the concept of "biopolitics"
as a supplement to Foucault’s "biopower." While "bio-power" they argue,
is the power "over life," they deploy the concept of bio-politics to
argue for an autonomous "power of life" to resist. In doing so, as this
essay discusses at length further below, they posit an abstract and
essentially spiritualist concept of a creative life force—a
neo-Augustinian conception of life—outside the social and historical as
the basis of a new "commonwealth" and "mass exodus" from capitalism.
Giorgio Agamben, in contrast to Hardt and Negri, uses the term "bio-politics"
instead to refer to the "mechanisms and calculations of State power"
over life—what Foucault calls "biopower"—rather than an
autonomous "power of life." For Agamben, what Hardt and Negri call
the "power of life" to resist, is always already an extension of the
sovereign "power over life" not a resistance to it. The "originary
moment" of politics, according to Agamben, is that natural life, "the
simple fact of living" or "life common to all" (what the ancient Greeks
called zoē) has been subsumed, "captured" by "biopolitical
regimes of power" so that precisely when natural life (zoē) is
posited to be "outside" of sovereign power (bios)—banned by it,
excluded from it—this is actually an extension of the inside of
sovereign power. Politics, in other words, is always already the
inclusion of this "excluded" life, the politicizing of natural life—the
reduction of bodies to de-sacralized or "bare life." Yet, despite their
different theories and different semantic uses of the term
"bio-politics," Agamben’s biopolitical theory as a whole is
predicated—as much as is Hardt and Negri’s theory—on restoring a
spiritualist concept of life. In contrast to the life of "bios
and zoē"—at the interstices of which, Agamben contends, is always
already de-sacralized "bare life"—Agamben posits a "new form-of-life," a
"messianic redemption" or "happy life" as a moment of transcendence (Means
Without End 114-115). Finding even Foucault to be "too historical"
for positing biopower as a stage in the development of history, and
history itself to be always already a reduction of life to bare life,
Agamben puts forward this new form of life as outside of history. For
Agamben, there is no historical possibility of ending
exploitative social relations and bringing about freedom through
material transformation—all social, political, and historical
life is always already a violent subordination of life to bio-politics.
All historical and social life—regardless of the actual social and
economic organization of society—is in this view always already a form
of "de-sacralized" life or "bare life" (Homo Sacer 82).
Rather than articulating a materialist theory of social transformation
and the historical and material possibility of bringing about social
relations free from exploitation, Agamben articulates a spiritual song
of mourning and melancholia for a "lost" sacred life that has
never been: "Redemption is not an event in which what was profane
becomes sacred and what was lost is found again. Redemption is, on the
contrary, the irreparable loss of the lost" (The Coming Community
102). Social transformation is reduced to a spiritual
journey toward the "messianic" common life "to come" that can never
fully be materialized without becoming "bare life"—a journey, in other
words, in which the working class, like Ralph Ellison’s invisible man at
the Battle Royal, is "kept running." This essentially spiritualist understanding of life,
moreover, is codified on a new level within a specific variant of
biopolitical theories—transspeciesist posthumanism—which posits a common
spiritual life beyond historical differences between "humans" and
"animals" as the basis of new global social relations. As a form of
biopolitical ideology, transspecies posthumanism displaces class
relations with an ahistorical and spiritualist understanding of common
life. Transspecies posthumanism does so more specifically by declaring
the historical differences between species—specifically between humans
and other animals—as a metaphysical abstraction of the the common fact
of living that exists within all species. One of the main goals of
transspecies posthumanism is to divert attention away from class
relations and exploitation of surplus-labor, by enacting a "fissure" in
the concept of the human—that is, by ideologically dissolving the
historical difference between human and animal—and, in so doing,
invoking a "crisis" in the concept of human labor-power.
Transspecies posthumanism, therefore, situates "life"—which it
understands as "transspecies" life or life common to all species—outside
of the historical relations that produce differences between the
species. In doing so it dispense with projects for material
transformation of historical relations of production on the grounds that
they are "violently anthropocentric" and function on the basis of what
Donna Haraway calls "the goad of human exceptionalism" (When Species
Meet 46). One of the central concepts through which biopolitical
and transspecies posthumanist theories advance a new spiritualism is in
their theorizations of "love." "Love" is re-articulated in these
discourses as an autonomous life-force that will bring into being new
social forms and particularly a new "true," alternative
globalization—what Hardt and Negri call an "ontological event" which
brings into being the "commons," and Donna Haraway calls an
"other"-world but is, in actuality, a spiritualist theory of the
"other-worldly" which provides an ideological space for the privileged
to accommodate capitalism and the exploitation of labor of the majority,
in the name of a "resistant" and alternative globalization. In
particular, post-nuclear and transspecies love, family and/or sexual
relations are put forward in biopolitical and posthumanist theories as
"constitutive" of a new world order. This paper addresses the class
politics of the new bio-political and transspecies posthumanist
spiritualism and especially what they offer as "resistant" theories of
questions of life, love, family, and sexuality now. In particular, this
essay critiques the class politics of Hardt and Negri’s argument that
"love" is a "biopolitical event" that constitutes the commons, including
their seemingly radical argument in Commonwealth for a "mass
exodus" from the family and capitalism, which they argue is an
institution which corrupts the creative forces of biopolitical labor and
prevents the multitude from bringing about commonwealth in society.
As well, this essay critiques the class politics of Donna Haraway’s
transspecies posthumanist theory of love in which intimacy and "love"
with companion species are represented as a radical "other-world-making"
evolution and thus, representing capitalism itself as evolved and the
regime of the "evolved." The argument that biopolitics is a form of
spiritualism, to be clear, is at odds with the claims and
self-representations of bio-political cultural theorists, who contend
that their theories are a "new" and "true" form of materialism.
Bio-politics maintains that capitalist relations of production has been
fundamentally materially transformed by the development of
bio-technologies, cybertechnologies, knowledge work, the growth of
service industries, the erosion of industrial manufacturing in the
North... so that earlier distinctions between "productive" and
"reproductive" labor have collapsed. Antonella Corsani, for example,
claims that "what is emerging from the metamorphoses of capitalism is a
new relationship between capital and life" (107). "The sphere of
reproductive activities," Corsani contends, "is integrated into that of
production, so that ‘life itself’ is productive of surplus-value"
whether we are eating, drinking, "even," she claims, "when we are
sleeping or making love" (117). Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri
confirm this assumption when they suggest that we should no longer speak
of capitalism in terms of "productive labor" but of "biopolitical labor"
(which they use as a trope for reproductive labor) which produces social
life itself or "subjectivities." In their recently published book,
Commonwealth, Hardt and Negri displace "exploitation" with
"alienation" as the key site of struggle and social transformation when
they declare: "we find ourselves being pulled back from exploitation to
alienation, reversing the trajectory of Marx’s thought" (139-140).
According to Hardt and Negri, "alienation" has no material relation to
exploitation (the theft of surplus-labor by owners of the means of
production during the working day) and this, they claim, is owing "to
the fact that some characteristics closely tied to exploitation
particularly those designating capital’s productive role, have faded"
(140). On this basis bio-political theories posit
reproduction—what Hardt and Negri refer to as "biopolitical
production"—as having materially displaced production in capitalism. What has actually been occurring in transnational
capitalism, however, is not a disappearance of productive labor or
exploitation (the theft of worker’s surplus labor by owners of the means
of production), but the transfer of productive labor and the export of
capital from the global North to the global South in search of securing
sources of cheaper labor to exploit. As Paula Cerni has argued
"something very material has accompanied the creation of a
‘post-material’ economy where 83% of non-farm employees work in
services." Far from actually bringing about a "post-material" economy
"the real shift towards [unproductive] service sectors in
Western economies" has resulted in a situation in which Western
economies "no longer produce enough goods to fund [their] own massive
physical requirements, and, as a result, [they are] running an
unprecedented trade deficit" (Cerni n. pag.). What is at the root of
this is the fact that it is labor not the "immaterial" of culture or
ideology that is the source of social wealth. It is precisely because
the basis of profit has been and continues to be the exploitation of
productive labor that the wealth of North Atlantic capital—and its share
of the profits of the world market—is in decline as it has concentrated
investment in reproductive labor within its own respective national
borders, has relied more heavily on productive labor around the world.
To conflate the shifts in the way in which North Atlantic capital aims
to acquire a larger share of the social wealth in transnational
capitalism, with a fundamental change in basis of how this wealth is
actually produced in transnational capitalism, is a parochial analysis
of the global economy that erases the continued exploitation of surplus
labor of workers around the world in China, in India, in Pakistan, Iraq,
Afghanistan... These shifts in production are not a break from the
class relations of capitalism and the exploitation of workers around
the world; they are an intensification of its irreconcilable class
contradictions. And the consequences of these class contradictions and
their "solutions" have been devastating for workers both in the global
North and the global South, from the spiking of unemployment, to the
loss of homes and pensions, to the gutting of public infrastructure for
workers and transferring this social wealth to corporations, to
increases in suicide rates, depression, anxiety, and pharmaceutical
dependency, to "jobless and wageless recovery" which, in actuality,
means an increase in the rate of exploitation of workers. I argue that biopolitics and transspecies posthumanism,
in displacing "class" with "life," "production" with "reproduction,"
"labor" with "love," are affective and ultimately spiritualist
understandings of material contradictions that articulate what Marx
calls an "inverted world-consciousness." In "A Contribution to a
Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: Introduction," Marx
critiques religion for the way in which it articulates an inverted world
consciousness because, on the one hand, it is "an expression
of and protest against real suffering" and, on the other
hand, it provides an "illusory happiness" for "real suffering." By
"illusory happiness" Marx means that religion provides an illusory
resolution of the material contradictions of exploitation in capitalism
that cause the "real suffering" to which religion is both an effect and
a response. In this way, rather than providing a material solution to
problems of social alienation whose origin are in material relations of
production, religion ends up providing a "spiritual aroma" for
capitalism that helps to ideologically blur material relations of class
and culturally adjust exploited workers to ruling class interests. It is
on this basis that Marx argues that "The call [to workers] to abandon
illusions about their condition is the call to abandon a condition which
requires illusions" (131). Biopolitics and transspecies posthumanism articulate
the "spiritual aroma"—the cultural imaginary—of transnational capital
now. They do so by putting forward a "common share" in the "immaterial"
of a new "global" culture under capitalism in place of transformation of
the material relations of production in capitalism and freedom from
exploitation. In doing so they serve to naturalize the material
relations of exploitation and culturally adjust the contemporary
workforces to the needs of capitalism now. In this respect,
bio-political and transspecies posthumanist theories of love are a
continuation—in a new historical form—of updating the working class into
a new morality. George Sampson, in his 1921 book on British national
education, English for the English, provides a telling historical
example of this practice in his comments on the role of teaching
"English" literature and culture to the working-class: "Deny to
working-class children any common share in the immaterial, and presently
they will grow into the men who demand with menaces a communism of the
material" (as qtd in Eagleton 21). To put this another way, the "common
share" in the "immaterial" of "culture" for all, was proposed by
representatives of ruling class interests, such as Sampson, in order to
ideologically smooth over severe material contradictions which were
leading British workers to increasingly call into question the basis of
ruling class wealth in their own exploitation. More generally,
moreover, these comments are symptomatic of the fact that it is in the
material interests of capital to provide "immaterial" and "spiritual"
resolutions to deflect attention away from the economic and at the same
time maintain the cultural cohesion of social bonds that are
necessitated by social relations of production founded on exploitation. Bio-political and transspecies posthumanist theories
of "love" are ideological and illusory articulations of
workers’ actual need to do away with the conditions that "require
illusions." They are a form of "inverted world-consciousness" because
they obscure the material need of workers to abolish the material
relations under which they are exploited—material relations, that is,
which lead to sharpening alienation for workers. This is to say that
biopolitical and transspecies posthumanist theories of love are
ideological and illusory not because exploited workers do not actually
have affective needs; workers do, indeed, have affective needs such as
needs for love. Rather, they are ideological and illusory—a form of
"inverted world-consciousness"—because they present love as a spiritual
force that will heal social alienation without the transformation of
material relations founded on private property and exploitation that
produce alienation in the first place. In this sense, biopolitical and transspecies
posthumanist theories of love, not only articulate the cultural
imaginary of capital but in doing so they fulfill a practical need for
capital. This is because changes in social reproduction—including love
relations—without fundamental changes in the social relations of
production (class relations) are the means by which the ruling class has
always ideologically updated the contemporary workforces of capitalism
with the skills and cultural intelligibilities needed to be more
effectively and profitably exploited in new conditions of production.
Bio-politics and its variations such as transspecies posthumanism are
aimed at updating, reforming and crisis managing capital and
particularly, producing new subjectivities who will adjust to the needs
of capital now. The general return of contemporary cultural theory to
focus on questions of "love"—and its spiritualization of love as a
creative "life-force" in bio-political and transspecies posthumanist
theories in particular—is, as I have marked above an ideological
response to material contradictions in transnational capitalism now.
At the same time and more generally, however, "love" becomes a question
for cultural theory and a site of contestation because "love" is what
historical materialist Alexandra Kollontai calls a "profoundly social
emotion" (278). Kollontai means by this that love—and specific forms of
love—are produced under definite social relations of production
and at the same time help to reproduce these material relations
of production (278). "Love" plays a cultural and reproductive role in
strengthening the social bonds that have been made materially necessary
to a given society. On this point, Kollontai argues, At all stages of human development love has (in
different forms, it is true) been an integral part of culture. […] Love
is not in the least a "private" matter concerning only the two loving
persons: love possesses a uniting element which is valuable to the
collective. This is clear from the fact that at all stages of historical
development society has established norms defining when and under what
conditions love is "legal" (i.e., corresponds to the interests of the
given social collective), and when and under what conditions love is
sinful and criminal (i.e., contradicts the tasks of the given society).
(278-279) "Love" is the subject of social contestation because
of its historical role in strengthening the bonds of social
relations which have been made historically and materially necessary to
a given mode of production. Love is not transhistorical but
socially produced under definite conditions. Specific forms of love are
produced and become culturally "valuable" within a given set of material
relations of necessity for the way in which they help to reproduce the
existing social relations of production. In class society, this means
that the dominant forms of love become dominant or culturally valuable
because they help to maintain the existing class relations and to
reproduce the conditions necessary for maintaining class relations. This role of love in strengthening social bonds in
general—and the social bonds of class relations in particular—is
historically and socially produced. For instance, Kollontai remarks
that, "the ancient world considered friendship and ‘loyalty to the
grave’ to be a civic virtue" whereas "love in the modern sense had no
place and hardly attracted the attention either of poets or of writers"
(280). This is owing to the fact that in order to reproduce its
conditions of production, the ruling classes of the ancient world
"recognized only those emotions which drew its fellow-members close
together and rendered the emerging social organism more stable" (280).
Moreover, under feudalism, where the feudal household is a site of
production of social wealth, marriage is contracted according to the
material interests of the family and individuals who choose a married
partner against these interests are severely criticized. "Love" in
marriage is not emphasized. However, what is valued as a "moral virtue"
in feudalism is "chivalrous love" outside of marriage by a knight
of an inaccessible woman of the ruling class—a "lady" of "nobility" such
as the wife of a feudal lord or the queen. This re-articulation of
"platonic" or "ideal" love—expressed not only in poetry but in military
acts of "heroism"—is considered valuable under feudalism for the way in
which it serves as a means to bind men of the exploited classes to fight
on behalf of the material interests of their feudal lords (280-281).
Lastly, as Kollontai demonstrates, the dominant sexual morality of
"possessive individualism" that develops with the emergence of
capitalism is not transhistorical but enabled by historical and material
relations of production (237-249). More specifically, as the extended
feudal household is broken up by the emergence of wage-labor/capital
relations, the prevailing sexual morality and ideals of love also
change. While capitalism, like feudalism, is a form of class society
based on private ownership of the means of production and the private
appropriation of surplus-labor, in contrast to feudalism, it entails the
dominance of commodity production outside the household as the main form
of the production of social wealth and converts labor-power from serf
labor tied to the household to a "commodity" on the market. Under these
new material relations of production, the family is no longer the main
site of the production of social wealth but a site on the one hand of
reproduction of the concentration of wealth into fewer hands (for
bourgeois families) and, on the other, of the reproduction of
exploitable labor-power by working class families. Correspondingly the
prevailing sexual morality and ideals of love are changed. As capitalism
develops and the family is pared down, nuclear "family values" and
possessive individualism become the cultural ideal and prevent workers
from seeing their mutual common interests as a class and to emotionally
tie them into the new social relations of reproduction and production. In historical materialist theory love and new moral or
ethical codes of love, however, do not in themselves bring about new
social forms. The shifts in new forms of sexual morality and love are
made possible by material developments and changes in the social
relations of production. And these new forms of love then serve to
reproduce the material relations of production. New social relations of
production can only be brought about by means of material praxis
(revolution). And in turn, new forms of love presuppose the development
of new material conditions for their production. Even in Kollontai’s
concepts of forms of love which break from private property modes of
love—for instance, what she calls "red love" or "love-comradeship"—such
forms of love are not "autonomous" forces but presuppose the
emergence of new material relations of production; either new material
relations that have been brought into being by social praxis or are in
the course of formation. A break from private property forms of
love, in other words, necessitates the abolition of private property in
the relations in production. The re-turn in contemporary cultural theory to focus
on questions of "love" and "affect" more generally, is an articulation
of the fact that love is a social emotion and an integral part of
culture that is useful for reproducing the social relations of
production. Love, and different forms of love, therefore becomes a
site of conflict and struggle in cultural theory and in daily life
precisely because of the relation of love to material relations.
This as well, continues today: as class contradictions in capitalism
have intensified and more family members have been pulled into the
wage-work force, capital also puts pressure on the nuclear-family form
insofar as it has begun to serve as a barrier for capital to extract
more surplus-labor from the existing workforce. As a consequence a "new"
flexible, "post-nuclear," and "posthuman"—but not
post-class—sexual and moral code of love is emerging. The old morality
of love is serving as a hindrance in many cases to the intensification
of the exploitation of workers’ surplus-labor around the world. The new
spiritualism of "love"—in both its biopolitical and transspecies
posthumanist variations—is at root an ideological purging of "old" moral
codes of love and sexuality once useful to the ruling class during
an earlier stage in the development of capitalism and bringing about new
moral codes of love and sexuality useful for adjusting workers to the
intensification of class contradictions in transnational capitalism now.
And yet, bio-political theories of love ideologically invert the
relationship of these new "post-nuclear" and "post-human" moral codes of
love to the material relations of production and posit new forms of love
as themselves constituting new material relations in society. In
concealing the relationship of love to class relations and diverting
attention away from the need to transform the material relations of
production, these spiritualist theories of love also conceal the fact
that the "new" "post-nuclear" forms of love and sexuality they promote
are not a break from capitalist relations of production, but an
updating of its social relations of reproduction to adjust workers to
the intensification of class contradictions now. TWO In the discourses of bio-politics love is abstracted
from its relation to the material relations of production and grasped
primarily as a trans-social affective and spiritual "life force" that
"creates" and brings into being new social forms. Love is
"spiritualized." It is represented as a "creative life force" that will
heal social alienation in capitalism—which has its origin in the
material contradictions of production in capitalism—without actually
transforming the material relations of production founded on
exploitation. For example, in Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s latest
book, Commonwealth (Harvard UP 2009), they argue that "love" is a
"biopolitical event" that "produces the commons" (183). In other words,
their claim is that love brings about new social relations that break
from private property and bring about a "commonwealth." To understand
their claims about "love as a bio-political event" that brings about a
change in material relations, it is first necessary to understand what
Hardt and Negri mean by "bio-politics." Drawing on Foucault’s theory of
bio-power, they make a distinction between "bio-power" and
"bio-politics." Hardt and Negri deploy the concept of "bio-power" to
refer to the "disciplinary regimes, architectures of power, and the
applications of power through distributed and capillary networks" that
are the subject of Foucault’s investigations and that he argues do not
"repress" but "produce" subjectivities. Hardt and Negri point out that
"bio-power," although considered by Foucault to be productive of
subjectivities rather than "repressive" of pre-existing subjectivities,
is nonetheless a concept which discusses regimes of "power over
life" (57; emphasis added). By contrast, Hardt and Negri use another
term, "bio-politics," to refer to what they regard as "the other
to power (or even an other power)" (56). They contend that "there
is always a minor current that insists on life as resistance, an other
power of life that strives toward an alternative existence" (57). In
other words, in contrast to "bio-power" which is "power over
life" bio-politics, in Hardt and Negri’s theorization of it, is the
"power of life" and, more specifically, the "power of life to
resist and determine an alternative production of subjectivity" which
"not only resists power but also seeks autonomy from it" (56-57).
Moreover, Hardt and Negri not only understand "bio-politics" as a
striving toward autonomy, but as having an an autonomous
origin that transcends the historical and material relations of
society: "the biopower against which we struggle is not comparable in
its nature to the form of power by which we defend and seek our freedom"
(57). "Biopolitics"—as Hardt and Negri understand it as the
"power of life to resist"—is at root a theory of "creative life force,"
or what Spinoza calls potentia and Henri Bergson calls elan
vital, which has its philosophical roots in spiritual creationisms.
"Biopolitics" with its reliance on an autonomous "power of life" to
"resist" is a spiritualizing of the dialectical praxis of labor and an
erasure of the material relations of production. It translates what Marx
calls the "dialectical praxis of labor" into spiritualist terms by
abstracting "life" from its material conditions of possibility and
ideologically converting productive activity or labor—which exists in a
necessary relation to the relations of production—into an autonomous
"creativity." The existence of "life," which is to say "the
existence of living human individuals," and the "power to resist"
presupposes material conditions which can enable and sustain human life.
This is the case since men and women "must be in a position to live in
order to be able to ‘make history’"; they must be in a position to
satisfy needs of "eating and drinking […] habitation, clothing and many
other things" (Marx and Engels, German 42). In order to satisfy
needs to sustain human life, the existence of human life is not only
dependent on the means of subsistence, but on labor. Labor is, as
Engels puts it, not only the source of all wealth but "next to nature,"
he argues, "it is the prime basic condition for all human existence" (Dialectics
170). There is no "human existence" that is prior to labor and labor
is itself not outside of history; it is a dialectical and material
relation:
Labour is, first of all, a process between man and
nature, a process by which man, through his own actions, mediates,
regulates and controls the metabolism between himself and nature. He
confronts the materials of nature as a force of nature. He sets in
motion the natural forces which belong to his own body, his arms, legs,
head and hands, in order to appropriate the materials of nature in a
form adapted to his own needs. Through this movement he acts upon
external nature and changes it, and in this way he simultaneously
changes his own nature. (Marx, Capital 283) The existence of human "life" and its course of
development never exists independently of the material conditions of
production prevailing at the time (the forces of production) and the
social relations within which this production takes place (the relations
of production or property relations). And these conditions and
relations are themselves the product of past labor and, in turn, shape
the course of all other aspects of social life. But labor conditions
never remain static: as the forces of production develop this results in
the production and satisfaction of new needs which come into direct
contradiction with the relations of production, requiring transformation
in the relations of production. Human existence is not prior to the
social "metabolism" between the forces of production and the relations
within which this production takes place and are transformed. As Marx
and Engels argue, The fact is, therefore, that definite individuals who
are productively active in a definite way enter into these definite
social and political relations […] the social structure and the state
are continually evolving out of the life-process of definite
individuals, however, of these individuals, not as they may appear in
their own or other people’s imaginations, but as they actually
are, i.e., as they act, produce materially, and hence as they work under
definite material limits, presuppositions and conditions, independent of
their will. (Marx and Engels, German 41) Biopolitics, by abstracting life from the material relations of
production and the dialectical praxis of labor, puts forward an
understanding of the "power of life" as limitless. In erasing the
relation of necessity between "life" and the dialectical praxis of
labor, one of the goals of biopolitics and its ideological renewing of
spiritual creationism is, as I discuss further below, to update the
contemporary workforces of capitalism to increase their productivity
(under the banner of the "power of life") without eradicating
exploitation in production. Raising productivity without eradicating
exploitation means raising the rate of exploitation of workers with the
aim of raising the rate of profit for capital. By theorizing love as a "bio-political event" Hardt and Negri
understand it as a trans-material, trans-social, and trans-historical,
"creative life force." They argue that love, as a bio-political event,
is "productive" by which they mean that it produces "new subjectivities"
and "singularities" and, they add, it is productive of new social forms
and relations: "When we engage in the production of subjectivity that is
love, we are not merely creating new objects or even new subjects in the
world. Instead we are producing a new world, a new social life" (181).
What Hardt and Negri call relations of "production" are actually
relations of reproduction. In their theory, the relations
of reproduction in capitalism—and specifically the ideological
reproduction of subjectivities and the relations through which this
takes place—are considered to be the material terrain of social
transformation and freedom. The actual material relations of
production—the labor and property relations by which social wealth is
produced—and the relationship of love to these relations of production
are inverted and hidden from view. The assumption of this theory is that capitalism is held in place at
root not by its material relations of production but by the reproduction
of subjectivities who will adjust to and participate in capitalist
production. Moreover, by this logic, change in subjectivities—or
subjective change—is taken to constitute material change as an end in
itself. In this narrative subjective change and more specifically,
the mere act of "loving"—or "loving differently" —as an end in itself
"constitutes" new social relations: "love is a process of production of
the commons and production of subjectivity. This process is not merely a
means to producing material goods and other necessities but also
an end in itself" (180). No transformation outside of "loving
differently" and transforming the forms of affective relations is,
according to this theory, necessary in order to bring about human
freedom. In this theory, not only are the relations of production
ideologically "dematerialized" but so are the relations of reproduction
themselves. When Hardt and Negri appear to make references to "love" and
"love relations" as "social," they do not mean by this that love—and the
form that it takes—presupposes specific social relations and material
conditions of possibility, rather they theorize "love" as a
transsocial and immaterial life force that brings into being
new social forms. Love, they claim, is at root an "ontological event"
that constitutes being and reality as such: Every act of love, one might say, is an ontological
event in that it marks a rupture with existing being and creates new
being [...] Being, after all, is just another way of saying what is
ineluctably common, what refuses to be privatized or enclosed and
remains constantly open to all. (There is no such thing as a private
ontology.) To say that love is ontologically constitutive then, simply
means that it produces the common. (181) Love, in this argument, is outside of social relations
but "creates" them. Social relations in other words presuppose love.
Human life and reality as such presuppose love in this scenario. Love,
in this narrative, is both origin (arche) and end (telos)
of reality or Being as such. At different points in their narrative
Hardt and Negri refer to love as: an "economic power"; an affective
network; a bio-political event; an bio-political force which
creates and brings into being new social forms; a force which composes
singularities (differences) within the commons; and the basis of
ontology or Being as such (180-183). In short, in
Commonwealth, love is understood in theological and spiritualist
terms: it is regarded to be all powerful, it is all knowing, absolute
reality, it is all encompassing, it creates all that is and all that
will ever be. It is ideologically "cleansed" from its actual relation to
the material relations of production. To complete their theological sermon on the "power of
love," Hardt and Negri argue that love is a "force to combat evil"
(189-199). Here Hardt and Negri deploy the theological concept of "evil"
in place of a rigorous historical materialist analysis of material
contradictions. Having ideologically displaced the dialectical praxis of
labor as the basis of social forms with "love" as a creative life force,
the deployment of the concept of "evil" now enables Hardt and Negri to
displace analytical critique of private property relations and
exploitation as an explanation of social inequality with a theory of
moral and panhistorical "corruption." In Hardt and Negri, "evil" is
understood as the "corruption" of love and the common or what they
elsewhere call "love gone bad": Our proposition […] is to conceive of evil as a
derivative and distortion of love and the common. Evil is the corruption
of love that creates an obstacle to love, or to say the same thing with
a different focus, evil is the corruption of the common that blocks its
production and productivity. Evil thus has no originary or primary
existence but stands only in a secondary position to love. (192) According to Hardt and Negri’s logic, since love is an
ontological category that constitutes "being" and at the same time is a
creative life force that brings into being new social forms, "love"
brings about all social relations. Thus, social relations which are
unequal are, so the story goes, best "explained" as the "corruption" of
love or what they also call "love gone bad." To this end, they suggest
that "As soon as we identify love with the production of the common, we
need to recognize that, just like the common, love is deeply ambivalent
and susceptible to corruption" (181-182). On these terms, Hardt and
Negri posit that "capitalism" too, like all social forms is at root made
possible by love, but a "love gone bad" (193). Capitalism, in their
view, is not an historical relation based on private property relations
and the exploitation of labor-power—the theft of surplus labor in
production. Rather, they argue that capitalism and its alienating
effects are best explained as a form of "love gone bad," by which they
mean as a form of "corruption." More specifically, according to Hardt and Negri, the
"corruption" of love is manifested in "identitarian love" or "love of
the same" rather than "love of difference." Race love, nation love,
patriotism, romantic love, marriage-couple love are, for Hardt and Negri,
examples of "love of the same" (182-183). As an "antidote" to love of
the same, Hardt and Negri expand upon the concept of "love thy
neighbor," and following Nietzsche they argue that higher than love of
neighbor is "love of the farthest" (183). Here Hardt and Negri reduce
social transformation to moral platitudes and lessons in
multiculturalism and "loving difference." In doing so they erase the
fact that exploitation under capitalism is the root cause of
inequality and, as well, exploitation is entirely compatible with "love
of the farthest" as transnational capitalism goes "all over the globe"
and "must settle everywhere, nestle everywhere, establish connexions
everywhere" not only to expand its markets but to secure sources of
exploitable labor-power to stave off declines in profit (Marx and Engels
Manifesto 487). What Hardt and Negri then propose as the
"solution" to "love gone bad" or "love of the same" and toward the
"commons" is not social transformation but a "mass exodus" from
institutions of the family, the nation, the corporation... As a "force
to combat evil," Hardt and Negri contend, "love now takes the form of
indignation, disobedience, and antagonism. Exodus is one means […] of
combating the corrupt institutions of the common, subtracting from
claims of identity, fleeing from subordination and servitude" (195). Hardt and Negri’s argument for a "mass exodus" from
"old/bad" forms of love is, as I explicate further below, an updating of
the culture of capitalism—of the methods used to help reproduce the
social relations of production founded on exploitation—and not a break
from capitalism. However, before further examining Hardt and Negri’s
theory of "love," "evil," "corruption," and "exodus" and their
ideological role in transnational capitalism now, it is first important
to understand the genealogy of Hardt and Negri’s theory in classic
idealism. This is important both because Hardt and Negri overtly claim
to be producing a "materialist" theory and because their theory is taken
by others as a "new" "true" materialism. Materialism, broadly, is the
explanation of the origin of existence on the basis of exclusively
material relations and laws of motion. When Hardt and Negri claim that
love is "ontological" and constitutive of "Being," this does not mean
that they are working with a materialist understanding of love. Despite
their claims for a "materialist teleology" (59) and a "materialist
perspective" (194), at its core Hardt and Negri’s theory of love and the
"commons," is not actually an historical updating of materialism for new
material conditions of production that are in the process of formation,
but an ideological updating of classic Christian idealist (spiritualist)
ontology in which the "real" is represented as grounded in the ideal or
spiritual. This can be seen not only in their direct references to St.
Paul’s theology, but in how closely Hardt and Negri’s theory of "love as
being" and "love as a force to combat evil" resembles Augustine of
Hippos’ classic Christian idealist ontology of "God as being" and of
"good" and "evil" and their "relation" to each other. In classic
Christian ontology, "God is being" and is the "real." More
specifically, the concept of God, in classic Christianity, is understood
as absolute spirit: the all powerful, immutable,
ineffable, excessive, and unquantifiable divine life force. This concept
of absolute spirit, moreover, is regarded to be the absolute basis of
the real as such and is regarded as "supremely good." In this theory of
being, the concrete and sensuous world of the earth is considered to be
an effect of god. The world, in other words, according to this ontology
is "God’s creation" and God is its ‘life force." However, according to
classic Christian ontology, "God" is regarded to compose or
create but does not constitute the world. In other
words, for Augustine and classic Christianity in general, the divine
creator is not the creation. To put this another way, in
classical Christian ontology, the world is not seen as "God incarnate"
because, in this theory of ontology, "God" is an immaterial, divine
force which cannot be incarnated. In this view, "God" as absolute spirit
is outside any terms of empirical measurement, not contained in or by
any material, concrete, or sensuous form or relation. In the
Confessions, for example, Augustine remarks that "truth says to me:
Your God is not heaven or earth or any kind of bodily thing" (213).
Although, in the course of the Confessions, Augustine formally
rejects the theories of Plato and ancient Greek philosophy in general,
his theory of "God" at the same time derives from Plato’s concept of
ideal forms and the theory of ontology of which it is a part. In
Republic, Book X, for example, Plato distinguishes between "ideal
forms," which he argues is the product of "God" and is the one "true"
form; the concrete or material form manufactured by an artisan, which
Plato regards to be a copy of the ideal form; and the image or
representational form (as in painting or poetry) produced by what Plato
regards to be an "imitator" of the concrete. In this theory of ontology
the ideal form is the basis of being. The concrete form produced
by human labor is considered to be a lesser copy of the ideal form
produced by God, and the image or representation of the concrete form is
regarded by Plato to be an even lesser copy of a copy—an "imitation" of
a copy—of the ideal form (Plato, Dialogues 477-495). In the Confessions, "God" is being, and is the
"real," and the concrete and sensuous world is a second order reality or
"becoming" but not being itself. For example, Augustine remarks.
"I considered all the other things that are of a lower order than
yourself, and I saw that they are not absolute being in themselves, nor
are they entirely without being. They are real in so far as they have
their being from you, but unreal in the sense that they are not what you
are" (147). In this view, "God creates the world in his own image" but
the "image" (which in this theory of ontology is the concrete and
sensuous world) is an effect and (lesser) copy of "God."
In this view, the world then, because it is regarded to be created by a
divine life force that is "supremely good" is also good, but because it
is not this divine force in itself, it is a "lesser" good or second
order good. As such it is regarded to be subject to corruption. This
"corruption," in Augustine is given the name of "evil." In the classic
Christian ontology because God is regarded as absolute reality, as
Being, and as supreme good, "evil" is understood not to "exist." To
this end Augustine remarks: For you evil does not exist, and not only for you but
for the whole of your creation as well, because there is nothing outside
it which could invade it and break down the order which you have imposed
on it. Yet in separate parts of your creation there are some things
which we think of as evil because they are at variance with other
things. But there are other things again with which they are in accord,
and then they are good. In themselves, too, they are good. (148-149) Evil, for Augustine, is the absence of Being—its
disintegration—and the corruption of Being and the good . "Evil,"
as it is regarded by Augustine, is not an autonomous "force"—does not
"exist"—but is manifested in the corruption, disorder, decay and
dissolution of God’s creation which is good when things are "in their
proper place" but evil when it becomes disordered (150-151). Hardt and Negri formally distance their theory of love
(as divine life force) and evil (as earthly corruption of divine life
force) from Augustine’s theory of love, god and evil, by drawing from
Spinoza’s understanding that "evil" does "exist" but has a second order
existence. They claim that, Spinoza’s difference resides at a deeper level where
the education or training of the mind and body are grounded in the
movement of love. He does not conceive of evil, as does Augustine, for
instance, as the privation of being; nor does he pose it as a lack of
love. Evil instead is love gone bad, love corrupted in such a way that
it obstructs the functioning of love. […] And since love is ultimately
the power of the creation of the common, evil is the dissolution of the
common or, really, its corruption. (193) This is primarily a language game but not a break from
the basic spiritualist ontology of Augustine. While Augustine claims
that "evil" does not exist, he still deploys "evil" as an
explanatory concept in place of a rigorous explanation of historical
relations of production. In like manner, when Hardt and Negri, following
Spinoza, claim that "evil" does "exist" they are deploying a
concept that vacates materialist critique. The point of contention in this essay, however, is not
the specific theory of "evil" but the use of the concept of
"evil" to explain material contradictions and the social inequality that
arises from these contradictions. Any use of the concept of "evil" to
explain capitalism and exploitation is an ideological mystification of
material relations regardless of which specific theory of "evil" is
used. The concept of "evil" ideologically translates the material
contradiction of class society—and the historical and material causes of
intensified economic exploitation and social alienation in private
property relations—into an eternal existential condition of life as
such. "Love" is an autonomous life force but it is always already
subject to "evil" and corruption. According to Hardt and Negri, "this is
not to say we should imagine we can defeat evil once and for all—no, the
corruptions of love and the common will continue" (198). The structural
and systemic violence of capital, its onslaught into more levels and
areas of human existence, and the social alienation that results from
private property relations are abstracted from the historical conditions
that produce them and transcoded into a transhistorical "corruption"
rather than historical, and therefore, transformable material relations.
As a result, as classic Christian idealists, Hardt and Negri’s theory
also returns to Plato’s "ideal forms." "Love" and "the commons"
are deployed as ideal forms in which training is needed while the
struggle to transform the social relations of production—the material
relations of capitalism—is considered a corrupt copy of an ideal form.
This is the marketing of a new religion to the contemporary global
working class, dressed up as material resolutions to the class
contradictions workers face. This does not explain but explains away
and disappears the material contradictions in which workers live.
Deploying the concept of "evil" to explain away material relations, puts
the production of materialist knowledge of objective relations in
suspension—knowledge which is necessary for bringing about more
effective collective social transformation—and instead is aimed at
rallying people around "moral certitude" without knowledge. It is quite
telling for instance, when Hardt and Negri argue that their Spinozan
theory of "evil" provides a more effective "explanation for why at times
people fight for their servitude as if it were their salvation, why the
poor sometimes support dictators, the working classes vote for
right-wing parties, and abused spouses and children protect their
abusers" (193). "Such situations," they contend: are obviously the result of ignorance, fear, and
superstition, but calling it false consciousness provides meager tools
for transformation. Providing the oppressed with the truth and
instructing them in their interests does little to change things.
People fighting for their servitude is understood better as the result
of love and community gone bad, failed, and distorted. […] People are
powerfully addicted to love gone bad and corrupt forms of the common.
Often, sadly, these are the only instances of love and the common they
know! (193-194; emphasis added) Hardt and Negri update a ruling class paternalism that
workers do not need to know the truth of material relations or struggle
to produce concepts that can most effectively explain these relations.
According to their narrative, even if the oppressed "know the truth" of
material relations and their objective interests, it does "little good"
because the oppressed are "addicted" to their own oppression. Here, they
displace the materialist concept of exploitation of the
surplus-labor of the working class by capital as an explanation
of material contradictions in capitalism, including poverty, with the
psycho-affective concept of the "addiction" of the working class to
"corrupt" forms of love. They displace the explanatory concept of "false
consciousness" with the "ignorance, fear, and superstition" of workers.
Hardt and Negri claim that their approach embraces the "power" of the
poor. "The poor," Hardt and Negri contend, "are actually extraordinarily
wealthy," by which they further elaborate: "despite the myriad
mechanisms of hierarchy and subordination" they are "creative" and
"express an enormous power of life" (129, 131). This is an ideological
inversion of the exploitation of workers surplus-labor under capitalism
and a concealing of the brutal material contradictions under which
workers live with the promise of "hope" and "spiritual wealth" in place
of material equality. Moreover, according to this logic workers in
transnational capitalism do not suffer from the exploitation of their
labor or poverty at all, they suffer from a pathology—from a state of
"addiction"—and get in the way of their own already existing freedom and
"extraordinary wealth." The oppressed and exploited, in other words, are
according to this logic "pathological" and "choose" their own poverty
and exploitation. The implication of their argument regarding domestic
violence, for instance, is that domestic violence is the "addiction" of
abused spouses and children to "bad forms of love." This is not only not
feminism, it is sexist anti-feminism which pathologizes the
abused, oppressed and exploited and ideologically disappears the
structural relations and the material contradictions of private property
that enable the growth of domestic violence. What Hardt and Negri
advance in the name of the "commons" is a cynical volunteerism and
moralism against the working class. Workers’ collective struggle for
socialism and to end the exploitation of their surplus-labor is
demonized as "evil" and "corrupt" and what the workers "really need,"
according to Hardt and Negri’s sermon, is education and training in
"love." The (ideo)logic of this is that the exploited and oppressed are
poor and exploited because they don’t know how to love. As in all forms of ideology, Hardt and Negri’s
biopolitics is enabled by specific historical and material relations
and, at the same time, ideologically inverts them. While the
theory of "evil" and "corruption" has a genealogy in classic
Christianity, it is resurrected today as a managerial strategy for
transnational capitalism. Hardt and Negri’s theory of the "corruption"
of love and the family and their argument for a "mass exodus" from the
capitalist family is not so much a break from capitalism as an
ideological updating of it. In order to critique Hardt and Negri’s
theory that the family is a "corrupt" form of love, it is next important
to understand their argument that capitalism its itself a form of
corruption. In Commonwealth, Hardt and Negri advance their
longstanding claim that "labor is increasingly autonomous" from capital
and that "capital is increasingly external to the productive process and
the generation of wealth" (141). "Biopolitical labor," Hardt and Negri
claim, autonomously produces common wealth (141). "Capital" they argue,
"may constrict biopolitical labor [and] expropriate its products [but]
does not organize productive cooperation" (140). In other words,
according to this narrative, there is no structural relation of
exploitation between capital and labor, therefore, the private
appropriation of socially produced wealth by capital is incidental
not systemic. It is in this way that Hardt and Negri go on to redefine
capitalism not as a mode of production, but as a form of
"corruption" of an already autonomously produced commonwealth. This
is entirely consistent with mainstream corporate theories which explain
away the global economic crises of capital as an effect of the
corruption of a handful of rogue financiers and in so doing conceal the
structural relations—the social relations of production in
capitalism—which reveal that exploitation and crisis is systemic and
endemic to production for profit, founded in private ownership of the
means of production. In much of their discussion of "commonwealth" what
they are actually arguing for is a capitalist managerial strategy of
raising the productivity of workers without transforming the social
relations of production as a response to economic crisis. If capital is
"external" to production and, moreover, production and labor are
"autonomous" from capitalism then, according to this narrative, there is
no need to transform the social relations of production and end private
ownership of the means of production. Simply raising productivity
itself—what Hardt and Negri call "expanding the commonwealth"—is,
therefore, represented in Commonwealth as a "revolutionary" act
of the "commons." Their main concern is that: Labor-power has always exceeded its relation to
capital in terms of its potential, in the sense that people have the
capacity to do much more and produce much more than what they do at
work. In the past, however, the productive process, especially the
industrial process, has severely restricted the actualization of the
potential that exceeds capital’s bounds. (191) By revising Marx’s concept of "labor-power" with
Spinoza’s concept of potenza they naturalize the productivity of
labor as an ahistorical "life force"—a natural and unlimited capacity of
the body—and obscure the way in which individual concrete labor (work
for wages) is shaped by abstract social labor (productive labor or what
Marx calls "species-being"). In doing so, by arguing for the
"actualization of the potential" of labor power to produce beyond the
limits imposed by the current working day of capitalism and by arguing
against the necessity to materially abolish class relations, Hardt and
Negri produce an argument for the indefinite extension of the working
day—seeking an increase in the rate of exploitation of the surplus-labor
of the worker through an absolute extension of the working day. On the
one hand, their argument that labor power has the potential to "do much
more and produce much more" than what is done at work is concerned with
increasing the extraction by capital of the surplus-labor of the
worker by intensifying exploitation and extending the workday of the
worker beyond the official working day in which they are paid an hourly
wage. On the other, it articulates material interests of capital to
constantly update its "production process" and techniques in order to
remain competitive with other capitals and to eliminate outdated
production practices that become a hindrance to the extraction of
greater amounts of surplus-labor for profit. The actual aim of this
corporate theory is not to end the exploitation of labor, but to get rid
of the old forms of capitalist production and the old
institutions that have supported its reproduction that are now becoming
fetters to profit for transnational capital, without abolishing
the content of capitalist production: private ownership of the
means of production and the theft of workers’ surplus-labor by the
owners of the means of production (exploitation). This is another
way of saying that Commonwealth supports increases in the rate of
exploitation of workers in capitalism and represents intensified
exploitation of workers as if it were liberation. It is on these terms—i.e., on the terms of updating
the relations of reproduction in capitalism and not on the terms of
actually emancipating people from capitalism through ending the private
property relations on which the family is founded—that Hardt and Negri
declare that the family is a "corrupt" form of love and propose a "mass
exodus" from the family. A telling example of the class politics
of Hardt and Negri’s concept of "new" love relations is their
bio-political fable of "wasp-orchid love." In this fable, which they
present as an mass exodus from capitalism itself, they draw from Deleuze
and Guattari’s discussion of "wasp-orchid machine" (A Thousand
Plateaus) and rework it into a fable of "wasp-orchid love"—a concept
of so called "new" love relations which they contrast with both
"marriage, family, and couple love" and with "love of worker bees."
Hardt and Negri begin by criticizing Bernard Mandeville’s 18th
century entrepreneurial morality tale The Fable of the Bees—the
story of a bee hive "riddled with all order of private vices" and
competitive individualism, but wealthy and prosperous which is then
transformed into a "virtuous" and moral hive only to fall apart
economically. More specifically, they criticize a pervasive
interpretation of this fable, informed by Adam Smith’s reading of it,
which reads it as a "confirmation of capitalist ideology" (185). Hardt
and Negri particularly take issue with Adam Smith’s understanding that
"self-interest" is the basis of public good. "What Smith bans most
adamantly from the marketplace" they argue, "is the common: only from
private interest will public good result" (185). In order to formally distance their own argument from
this private property conception of human relations, they initially
contrast Mandeville’s pro-capitalist narrative, with the fable of the
"love of worker bees and flowers" (185). This latter fable
references the fact that bees, in the process of collecting nectar from
fruit trees to produce honey, cross-pollinate fruit flowers, thus
enabling them to bear fruit (185-186). "The economic fable of these bees
and flowers," they suggest, is not based on competitive individualism
and "self-interest" but, by contrast, "suggests a society of mutual aid
based on positive externalities and virtuous exchanges in which the bee
provides for the needs of the flower and, in turn, the flower fulfills
the bee’s needs" (186). And yet, according to Hardt and Negri, while
"Bees and flowers do indeed suggest a kind of love" it is, they contend,
"a static, corrupt form" (186). This is because, they claim: The dutiful worker bees […] joined with their flowers
in a virtuous union of mutual aid, are the stuff of socialist utopia.
All of these bees, however, belong to the bygone era of the hegemony of
industrial production. (187-188) Hardt and Negri’s casual dismissal of "love of worker
bees" is an oblique reference to the writings of Alexandra Kollontai in
such texts as her novel, Love of Worker Bees, as well as her
theoretical writings and speeches such as "Sexual Relations and the
Class Struggle" in which she develops a concept of "love-comradeship" or
"red love" founded on the material abolition of class. Their
rejection of production for need as "utopia" is already an indication of
how much their narrative is steeped in capitalist triumphalism which
presumes that class is the bedrock real. On this basis, for example,
they not only rationalize capitalism as "love gone bad" but, like Tea
Party reactionaries, they also demonize socialism and workers collective
struggle to transform the material relations of production in capitalism
"as evil"—as a "corruption of love and the commons" (198-199).
Switching species in order to write a "new fable,"
Hardt and Negri turn to Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of the
"wasp-orchid machine" in which, as Guattari has put it "wasps fuck
flowers" (as quoted by Hardt and Negri 186). More specifically,
some orchids give off the odor of the sex pheromone of female wasps and
moreover, their flowers are shaped like female wasp sex organs. In this
case, pollination occurs not through the collection of nectar to produce
honey, but through "pseudo-copulation" as "male wasps move from one
orchid to the next, sinking their genital members into each flower and
rubbing off pollen on their bodies in the process" (186). What makes
this fable a "radical break" from the "family" according to Hardt and
Negri, is its "immaterial production." Wasp-orchid love, they
claim, "is a model of the production of subjectivity that animates the
biopolitical economy" (188). Toward this end, they claim that: "These
wasps aren’t your dutiful worker bees; they aren’t driven to produce
anything. They just want to have fun" […] "The bees and flowers produce
honey and fruit, but the wasps and orchids are just hedonists and
aesthetes, merely creating pleasure and beauty!" (186-187;188). And
finally, "Wasp-orchid" love evokes images of "serial sex" and
"cruising," which they contend is a form of "resistance" to
"marriage-couple and family love." What Hardt and Negri put forward is actually a private
property conception of love. First, at this juncture, it is
important to point out that what Hardt and Negri call "love of worker
bees," while an oblique reference to the writings of Kollontai, is
actually an obscuring of Kollontai’s Marxist theory of love and
sexuality. What Hardt and Negri call "love of worker bees" in order to
dismiss Marxist theory and socialism, is not the historical materialist
theory of love and sexuality that is offered by Kollontai, but as
evidenced in their story of "bees and flowers" is more or less a
narrative of "bioharmony." By contrast, Kollontai’s theory offers an
enabling critique of the bourgeois family in its "nuclear" or
"marriage-couple" forms that also has profound implications for a
critique of the opportunist apologetics for capitalism that we see in
the "post-family" writings of Hardt and Negri and their fable of
"wasp-orchid love." Kollontai’s critiques of "marriage-couple love" is
not limited—as is Hardt and Negri’s criticism—to a moral
criticism of the family and what (as I discuss further below) is
essentially a spiritual, cultural, and moral updating of ruling class
"family" values into ruling class "(post)family" values. Rather,
Kollontai offers a critique of the economics of the family that cuts
through family values. For Kollontai, love is a "social emotion" the form of
which develops as an effective of the material relations of production.
Kollontai argues that love is an "integral part of culture"—meaning that
it is part of the role of culture in reproducing the existing social
relations of production. Love, in other words, is historical and does
not transcend the social relations of production. Love relations develop
in relation to the social relations of production. "From the very early
stages of its social being, humanity" living under specific historical
relations of production, "has sought to regulate not only sexual
relations but love itself" (279). This is because love serves to
strengthen the bonds of relationships that become economically necessary
to preserve the prevailing relations of production. This does not, of
course, mean that the forms of love prevail serve the interests of all
of humanity rather, they serve the dominant class interests. This is the case, Kollontai argues, with the
traditional "marriage-couple love" of the bourgeois "nuclear" family
form—with its proprietary culture of possessive individualism—that
emerges under capitalism. Kollontai argues that this form of family has
historically been useful for capital as a means of regulating the
concentration of wealth into fewer hands and of privately reproducing
the labor force out of the wages of workers, in the interests of profit
for capital. Yet, while workers are economically compelled to live in
the family and pool resources, the bourgeois family form does not
actually provide freedom for workers. Just as private property relations
give rise to a concentration of wealth within some families—and the
family as an institution developed as a protection of private property
relations—so it leads to poverty in working class families who are
required to shoulder the burden of the cost of reproducing living labor.
As Kollontai argues: "The destructive influence of capitalism destroys
the basis of the worker’s family and forces him unconsciously to ‘adapt’
to the existing conditions" (246). What she means by this is not that it
destroys the morality of workers and "corrupts" them, but that it
destroys the economic basis of their existence and impoverishes
them. These are part of the irreconcilable class contradictions of
capitalism: The family form that is useful for the ruling class to
reproduce the concentration of capital into fewer hands becomes a space
of dire need for the workers who must "privately" shoulder the cost of
reproducing exploitable labor power out of their wages. Under the
economic compulsion of class contradictions, workers find ways to adjust
to the economic contradictions and develop new forms of love, kinship,
and sexuality to work within the confines of capitalism. Kollontai, in
her own historical moment, cites the development of love and sexual
relations outside of the prevailing "marriage-couple" arrangements from
the mere postponement of marriage and children, to adultery and
prostitution, to polygamous marriage of three or four persons, to
"civil" or common-law marriages, to "free love," and so on. Today these
forms include not only the "serial sex" and "cruising" that are cited by
Hardt and Negri but various "post-nuclear" family, kinship, love, and
sexuality forms such as divorce-extended families, transnational love
relations, poly-sexual families, multi-ethnic families, post-marriage
families, virtual and online relationships, urban tribes and, as I
discuss further below, "transspecies" families among others. But these
cultural shifts in the affective relations of the family, love, and
sexuality do not in themselves constitute a transformation of the
conditions that exploit workers to begin with or that give rise to the
bourgeois family form. Without transformation of production relations
cultural shifts in love and sexuality relations are not freedom from
necessity but the inevitable results of conditions of necessity—in short
they are adjustments to the contradictory needs of capital and the
pressure that irreconcilable class contradictions exert on workers.
The "problem" with "marriage-couple love" under capitalism, as Kollontai
argues, is not simply its "hypocritical morality" but the "structure of
[the] exploitative economy" upon which the family rests (263). The
"hypocritical morality" of the bourgeois family is not an effect of
"moral corruption" it is a translation into culture of its underlying
class contradictions in production. These same class contradictions
undergird the so called "new" post-nuclear or post-family family. To
bring about changes in the moral and cultural relations does not in
itself change the exploitative economy upon which the family rests. In fact, Hardt and Negri’s theory conceals that
transnational capitalism necessitates new and different forms of love,
sexuality and reproduction relations. It is not workers who—by economic
necessity—adjust out of "free consent;" capital economically compels
workers to do this in order to have a more easily exploitable workforce.
The ruling class, Kollontai argues "seizes upon the new" family forms
developed by workers (247). Hardt and Negri’s celebration of
"wasp-orchid" love and their rejection of collectivity and solidarity of
workers (under the rubric of "love of worker bees") is just as much a
private property concept of love as "marriage-family couple love." Its
reliance, for instance, on "cruising" and "serial sex" as "antidotes" to
the bourgeois family form of "marriage-couple and family love" is not a
break from private property relations or love and sexuality under the
capitalist mode of production, but a marker both of the extension of the
market further and further into human sexual and love relations—that is,
the commodification of love and sexuality—and, moreover, of historical
shifts in production practices, but not production relations,
which put pressure on old family forms as an institution useful for
reproducing capitalism. "Serial sex" and "cruising" are
contemporary examples of what Kollontai calls the "passive adjustment of
the working class to the unfavorable conditions of their existence"
(247). Like "prostitution," serial sex and cruising with their market
logics of "free and equal exchange" undergirded by structural relations
of exploitation, are ruling class ideological resolutions to the
material contradictions and social alienation faced by the working class
under private property relations. Kollontai’s materialist analytics of the class
contradictions of love under capitalism teaches workers not to be fooled
by the ruse that the ruling class puts forward in equating changes in
cultural mores and family values—which capital necessitates of
workers—with changes in material relations. She points out that "The
champions of bourgeois individualism" routinely "say we ought to destroy
all the hypocritical restrictions of the obsolete code of sexual
behavior" (237). They do so when they find that older codes of sexual
behavior begin to become fetters for profit. And this is the case today
with the "marriage-couple" arrangement which, in many instances has come
to serve as a hindrance to profit for capital. The key, for capital now,
underlying the "new" post-nuclear forms of sex and love is that they are
flexible families and kinship relations. That is, they are
families that are flexible in their practices and schedules, in their
gender and sexual relations, in their understanding of what
"companionship" and "love" are—in short, they are flexible in the
methods they use to reproduce labor-power to allow for greater
pliability of the workforce to the dictates of production for profit in
global capitalism. "Post-nuclear" forms of love, kinship, and family are
commodified forms of love not in the sense of being morally
"corrupt" as conservatives argue. The "new" forms of family are as
commodified as the old forms because these family and love relations are
shaped by the needs of capital today for a "flexible" labor force that
has no permanent ties or commitments that will get in the way of higher
and higher levels of exploitation. Capital needs living labor, for
example, to be able to pick up and move for a new job or position in
another city, state, or nation. The decisive difference in Kollontai’s historical
materialist understanding of love and "love-comradeship" is that
Kollontai’s analysis does not conflate changes in forms of love with
social transformation. "Love-comradeship" for Kollontai is an important
social emotion in revolutionary struggle, but it is not an end in itself
and does not "constitute" social transformation. The assumption
that it does leads to the idea that changing family values automatically
and spontaneously brings about material change and freedom from
exploitation. Hardt and Negri put forward the understanding that "mass
exodus" from the family is in itself—spontaneously and
automatically—constitutive of transformation of material relations.
Hardt and Negri’s call for a "mass exodus" from the family, in which at
the same time they actively deny the need for workers to work to
transform production relations upon which social reproduction under
capitalism rests, covers over the dire conditions of necessity under
which workers are economically compelled to live in capitalism and works
to dismantle struggles for social transformation, displacing
transformation with cultural reform in capitalism. The "new"
post-nuclear family under capitalism is a cultural updating of the "old"
form family but not a material transformation of conditions of
exploitation. It continues to be what Jen Roesch, following Engels,
calls an "economic unit" under capitalism: The institution of the …family as an economic unit is
central to meeting the needs of capitalism. Under the current system,
employers pay workers a wage, but take no responsibility for most of the
social costs of maintaining the current generation of workers—or for
raising the next generation of workers into adulthood. Rather than these
responsibilities being shared collectively by society as whole […] they
are shouldered by individual families. (n. pag.) Under capitalism, workers reproduce their labor-power
privately out of their wages while the majority of socially produced
wealth is concentrated into fewer hands and put back into production for
the profit of the owners. But a change in the gender, sexuality, marital
status, and/or number of sexual partners and/or children is not a
transformation of this material relation of capitalism in which the
working class shoulders the economic burden of reproducing their own
labor-power and the next generation of labor-power out of their wages
while capital profits from the exploitation of their surplus-labor.
Moreover, in all cases the worker still must give her wages back to the
owners of the means of production in exchange for means of subsistence
on top of submitting to exploitation for the wages to begin with. What the narrative of "exodus" supports is not freedom
of the worker from conditions of necessity—which would require
transforming production relations and abolishing production for
profit—but the unfettered onslaught of capital and the increased
atomization of the worker. It is an articulation of the fact that
capital, at its basis, does not need the "marriage-couple" form per se,
so long as workers individually shoulder the cost of their own
reproduction. What capital aims to do is to control the rate of growth
and development of the surplus-value producing population. Thus when the
"marriage-couple" is useful for reproduction of supply of workers in
absolute terms it is promoted, but it can also get in the way of profit
when capital needs an immediate supply of readily available labor to
exploit—and thus capital works to dismantle or deregulate it and to
produce reproduction, love, and sexual relations which are more and more
subordinated to commodity exchange and production for profit. Ultimately, Hardt and Negri’s arguments are not
"resistance" but a normalization of the contradictory needs of capital.
On the one hand, they make an argument for the raising of productivity
without the transformation of social relations of production. They
endorse the notion that a "virtuous cycle" and raising productivity can
"expand the common." This is, as I have marked, a way to raise the rate
of exploitation. It is a recognition—by capital—that the exploitation of
labor is the basis of wealth and that no amount of
financial/usury/immaterial production actually produces wealth and that
to stave off economic crisis and the decline in the rate of profit
ultimately requires increasing the rate of exploitation, one way of
which is to increase the productivity of workers and get rid of old
production practices that now stand in the way of profit for capital. On the other hand, Hardt and Negri also maintain that
the exploitation of labor is part of a bygone era; that material
production has been superseded by immaterial—or biopolitical—production
and that what is important about biopolitical production is not the
production of material needs but the production of subjectivities. In
their reading of "love" and endorsement of the fable of "wasp-orchid
love" they proceed to oppose the notion of a "virtuous cycle" which they
now situate as part of the "love of worker bees." What they are
"discontented" with regarding the latter is its focus on "material
production." What they like about "wasp-orchid" love, by contrast, is
that it focuses on "immaterial production" of non-productive affect,
beauty, pleasures, fun and "subjectivity"—the sensual values of the
market. This contradiction—on the one hand raising material
productivity, without ending exploitation, in the name of "commonwealth"
on the other hand rejecting "productive labor" in the name of immaterial
production—is the effect of the contradictory needs of capital. On
the one hand, capital needs to raise the material productivity of
workers in order to extract more surplus-labor precisely because the
"immaterial economy" (concentration of service and non-productive labor
in the North as well as the export of capital to the South) has not led
to increases in wealth rather it is related to the crisis of profit. On
the other hand, capital works to conceal the fact that it is based on
the exploitation of productive labor and does so by ideologically
translating material contradictions—which are the result of the
exploitation of labor—into cultural values. The worker must produce more
and more material wealth but expect affect in return—she must be
contented with increased exploitation and poverty as long as she is
"rich" in "love" or "sex," etc. THREE While Hardt and Negri articulate a general theory of "biopolitics,"
the development of biopolitical ideology in contemporary cultural theory
takes on many forms. One such significant form is the development of
theories of transspecies posthumanism. Articulated in the writings of
Derrida (The Animal That Therefore I Am), Giorgio Agamben (The
Open: Man and Animal), and Donna Haraway (When Species Meet).
As I marked above, like other forms of biopolitical ideology,
transspecies posthumanism is also characterized by the displacement of
"class," "labor" and production, with "life" and "life force" (e.g., the
"power of life" etc.) as "explanations" of material relations of
production. More specifically, however, transspecies posthumanism goes
through the relay of the "animal" and "multispecies epigenetics" in
order to ideologically displace "human labor power," the dialectical
praxis of labor and the social relations of production. Contemporary
posthumanism, to put this another way, is a theory of transspecies—an
obscuring of the evolution of humans (through their labor) from
non-humans—e.g., "animals". Humans are, of course, animals but
they are animals with an historical difference—they have developed a
form of reasoning which is itself developed by praxis, that is, by the
dialectical praxis of labor and the ensemble of social relations of
production within which it develops. One of the main goals of
contemporary posthumanism is to divert attention away from class
relations and exploitation of surplus-labor, by enacting a "fissure" in
the concept of the human—that is, by ideologically dissolving the
historical difference between human and animal—and, in so doing,
invoking a "crisis" in the concept of human-labor power. Central to this movement in cultural theory is Donna
Haraway’s book, When Species Meet, in which she argues for the
dismantling of what she calls "The Great Divides" between animal and
human. Haraway cites as evidence of the collapse of boundaries between
human and other animals, "the fact that human genomes can be found in
only about 10 percent of all the cells that occupy the mundane space I
call my body; the other 90 percent of the cells are filled with the
genomes of bacteria, fungi, protists, and such, some of which play in a
symphony necessary to my being alive at all, and some of which are
hitching a ride and doing the rest of me, of us, no harm" (3-4). It is,
for example, on this basis that Haraway puts forward the understanding
that there is an aporia in Marx’s concept of human labor power.
She contends that while "Marx understood relational sensuousness, and
[...] the metabolism between human beings and the rest of the world
enacted in living labor […] he was finally unable to escape from the
humanist teleology of that labor—the making of man himself" (46). "In
the end," she argues, "no companion species, reciprocal induction, or
multispecies epigenetics are in his stories" (46). In short, Haraway’s
argument is that Marx has left out the "animal"—more specifically, the
genetic constitution of the "human" by various "companion species"—and,
therefore, according to Haraway, his focus on human-labor power is
violently "anthropocentric." According to this transspeciesist logic,
the biological constitution of the body defies the social logic of
capital because on the one hand, the "animal" cannot be understood in
terms of exploitation, Haraway claims, because "paws" are not "hands."
On the other hand, human bodies are "constituted" by myriad microscopic
"companion species" and therefore cannot be said to be distinctly
"human" at all (46). The exploitation of the surplus labor of the
majority of workers by a minority of owners in capitalism is, by this
logic, evidently "biologically impossible." This is a rehearsal and updating of the ideologic of
18th and 19th century pseudo-scientific discourses
of biological determinism such as craniometry in which the social and
historical relations of production that give rise to exploitation
were obscured and ideologically naturalized through the relay of the
physical "raced" body. To be clear, transspecies posthumanism is a
radically different form of this ideology. Haraway, for instance
re-maps the body not in terms of the "cranium" and "race" but in terms
of "dna" and "multispecies epigenetics." Moreover, while craniometry
worked to ideologically construct all kinds of so called sub-species,
posthumanism, by contrast, ideologically dissolves historical boundaries
between species. For transspecies posthumanism, it is not that human and
other animals are "identical" but that all species—and the material
relations of evolution as well as the historical differences in the
material conditions of evolution of a species—are now ideologically
dissolved into an "omni-species." This omni-species, so the story goes,
is itself constituted by multiple and, above all, post-binary
"differences" whose multispecies epigenetics manifest themselves in what
are believed to be "undecidable" ways. Any conceptualization of
historical boundaries between "species"—which would situate them in
relation to the structural relations in which they are produced—are
regarded to be an arbitrary and unethical cultural construction and a
violent fixing of amorphous, undecidable, plural, micro-differences into
metaphysical binary difference. This is a change in the form of 18th
and 19th century pseudo-scientific ideology but not its
content which reverts to the "physical body" and the so called
"received biology" of bodies in order to obscure the social relations of
production. Haraway substitutes the effects of evolution for the
dialectical relations of evolution when she displaces the material
conditions and relations under which natural selection and the
evolution of diverse species are made possible, with the genetic
"constitution" of bodies. This is a matterist understanding of biology
which substitutes the bodily sensuous—the received biology of "flesh and
blood" or the "physical"—for the ensemble of material relations that
determine the development of a species. But biological organisms
are mediated by what Marx explains as the dialectical praxis of labor
which acts on nature and transforms it in order to meet needs and in
doing so produces new needs. Even Haraway’s favored animal—the dog—is
not outside of the dialectical praxis of labor and the social relations
of production in which it develops—and the way in which these structural
relations transform the natural environment. As a species, the
evolution of the dog from the wolf is itself the effect of the
dialectical praxis of human labor as it intervenes in nature and
transforms it to meet needs, and in doing so transforms its own needs.
Dogs are a result of human breeding of wolves: "Humans lived as roaming
hunters and gatherers for most of their existence [and] wolves began
following hunter-gatherer bands to feed on the wounded prey, carcasses
or other refuse. At some stage a group of wolves, who happened to be
smaller and less threatening than most, developed a dependency on human
groups, and may in return have provided a warning system. […] Several
thousand years later […] people began intervening in the breeding
patterns of their camp followers, turning them into the first
proto-dogs" (Wade n. pag.). More generally, and more importantly, as Richard
Lewontin and Richard Levins argue in Biology Under the Influence,
"The socially conditioned [production] and transformation of our
environments" through the dialectical praxis of labor and the social
relations of production in which this labor is organized "determine the
actual realization of our biological limits" (36) Biology, they
argue, is not just "received biology" but "socialized biology" by which
they mean it is mediated by the material relations of production. This
is why, in advanced capitalism, A severe winter in an urban environment does not
produce frostbite but hunger—when the poor divert resources from food to
fuel […] It is the social mediation of individual biological phenomena,
by the social relations of production based on exploitation, that turns
a single day’s incapacity from the flu into the loss of a job from an
already marginalized worker, with consequent catastrophic economic
failure and a [further] disintegration of health and general conditions
of life. (Lewontin and Levins 37) While Haraway proposes that transspecies posthumanism
is a "materialist" theory which is more concerned with "mud," "slime,"
and "earth," than it is with the "sky" or "heavens" (3-4), having
ideologically displaced the historical conditions and material relations
that enable material development of "received" biology,
transspecies posthumanism—like other biopolitical discourses—puts
in their place spiritual causes. By dissolving all species
into an "omnispecies," transspecies posthumanism translates the material
relations of evolution and history through which biology is socially
mediated by the dialectical praxis of labor into a generalized
transhistory. The theory of transspecies, to put this another
way, ideologically dissolves historical life—life in historical
and material relations of production—into general abstract "natural
life" outside history. However, when the concept of "natural life," is
abstracted from the historical and material conditions and relations in
which it is produced, it is at root a spiritualist theory of life. This
fundamentally idealist concept of life is part of the contemporary
revival (also seen in the work of Agamben) of the concept that in
classical Greek philosophy is understood as zoē. As marked
further above, ancient Greek philosophy makes a distinction between two
concepts of life: zoē and bios. While bios is
regarded as mortal, biological life of, for example, the individual,
zoē, by contrast, was understood as abstract general life (what is
"common" to humans, animals, and God’s according the the ancient Greeks)
and more specifically as transcendent, spiritual "life" in
the absolute. What makes possible living beings, by this logic, is not
definite historical and material relations but an ahistorical, common
"life-force," which is a concept of life that has its root in a
spiritualist ontology (idealism). If we turn to some of Haraway’s cultural analysis, we
begin to see this spiritualism and "animism" at work. For instance, her
reading of "Jim’s found dog"—a photograph, taken by a colleague Jim
Clifford, of "a redwood stump covered with redwood needles, mosses,
ferns, lichens…" that resembles the shape of "an attentive sitting dog"
(5)—is premised on a spiritualist theory of "materiality" that is almost
identical to the theory at work in the "found" images of the Virgin Mary
in shadows, water stains, bird droppings—and in 2004 on a 10 year old
grilled cheese sandwich auctioned on Ebay for $28,000. According to
Haraway’s narrative it is the evolved consciousness that recognizes the
"canine soul [that] animate[s] the burned out redwood" (5). "Whom
and what do we touch when we touch this dog?" Haraway asks, and she
continues, "How does this touch make us more worldly, in alliance with
all the beings who work and play for an alter-globalization that can
endure more than one season?" (5). Here, Haraway reads "Jim’s found dog" as a figure of
an "other" globalization, what she also calls "alter-globalization" or "autre-mondialization"
and which she claims is a "more just and peaceful other-globalization"
(3). But her theory of "other-globalization" actually has very little
theoretical connection to the "worldly," or any materialist
understanding of the world. Rather it is a signifier for a
quasi-religious "other-worldliness." The "found dog" in Haraway’s
discourse is a trope for an ineffable, unrepresentable, transhistorical
life-force. To touch the "found dog" is, in this narrative, to touch a
life-force that "animates" all beings great and small from bacteria,
fungi, protists, to the H1N1 virus containing swine, human, and bird
genes, to the genetically altered onco-mouse and the cyborg. By this
logic, an "other globalization"--that is, a new social form, an other
world or other global society—does not have to be brought about by
material transformation of historical relations in transnational
capitalism. Rather, an "other-globalization" already exists
within the existing. We merely have to come to recognition of our
"natural co-existence," and it is this recognition that will actualize
the "other-world" in practice. And the way, according to Haraway’s narrative, is
through transspecies "love." "Love" of multi-species is conceptualized
in Haraway’s argument as a transformative life force that helps us "be
in touch" and "bring into being" the "other-world" within the world.
Haraway contends that "love" is a "world making" activity that brings
into being what she calls "other-globalization." It is "love" of
"companion species," "messmates," etc... that, she argues, brings into
being "a more just and peaceful other-globalization" (3).This is to say
that, like Hardt and Negri, Haraway not only displaces "class" and the
dialectical praxis of labor with "life" and "life force" but also
regards love—in this case love of multi-species "others" which is a
transspecies trope for what Hardt and Negri call love of difference and
alterity or "singularities in the multitude"—as a creative force and
"world-making" activity that brings into being new social forms and an
"other" world. And yet, the "new social forms" that Haraway argues for
are not a break from capitalist globalization they are founded on it.
For example, Haraway puts forward the idea that the emergence of the "transspecies
family" and intimacy with pets under capitalism’s commodity relations
marks a "new" and more "evolved" set of family relations. More
specifically she puts forward a narrative in which the market and the
commodification of pets and "pet needs" has developed a new and
"improved" emergent transspecies family relation. Owing to the
onslaught of the market and capitalist production into more and more
levels of social existence and the profits to be made by capital off of
the pet industry (from pet food, to chiropractic adjustments, mental
health therapy, and prescription anti-depressants for pets), now
animals—specifically the pets of the privileged—have "rights."
Haraway remarks: "dogs in capitalist technoculture have acquired the
"right to health," and the economic (as well as legal) implications are
legion" (49). In Haraway’s narrative, capitalism has evolved and
North Atlantic capital is the regime of the evolved who recognize their
"kinship" with animals and call for new transspecies family and
inter-subjective relations. For example, when comparing the cost of
cholesterol medication for humans with the cost of "doggie dinners,"
Haraway moralizes that she would "throw away my Lipitor before I shorted
my dogs and cats." On such practices she contends, "No one can convince
me that this […] reflects bourgeois decadence at the expense of my other
obligations" (51). "Furthermore," she adds,
There could be no end to the search for ways to
relieve the psychophysiological suffering of dogs and, more, to help
them achieve their full canine potential. […] I am convinced that it is
actually the ethical obligation of the human who lives with a companion
animal in affluent, so-called first-world circumstances. I can no longer
make myself feel surprised that a dog might need prozac and should get
it—or its improved, still-on-patent offshoots. (61) This narrative puts in suspension materialist critique
of class relations and the social relations of production in which the
needs of all sentient beings—human or animal—are subordinated to
production for profit and in which working class families are
economically forced to negotiate between basic needs for its members
(whether mono or multi-species) such as food and medicine. It then
translates these material contradictions of capitalism into "family
values" and "ethical" consumer choices. To critique the class privileges
of the North Atlantic consummative subject and the sentimentalizing of
these privileges—which are effects of class contradictions originating
in exploitation in transnational capitalism—as a manifestation of
"bourgeois decadence" is, consequently, represented as anthropocentric
and "unethical" to the treatment of animals. Haraway’s argument is not
at all a point of departure from "anthropocentrism" but rests on the
very presupposition of human superiority—the evolved superiority of the
first world subject—that it purportedly breaks from. It is in
their ethical superiority over others, that some humans have the
evolved consciousness to "recognize" their "kinship" with animals. This
is a class narrative which ideologically sutures an "evolved
consciousness" to the class privileges of some which are founded on
material relations of exploitation and production for profit in
transnational capitalism. This narrative uses animals as a decoy
to disappear class relations and present social inequality as an effect
of cultural and family values. Haraway claims her argument is a "materialist"
understanding of love, because she understands "love" as a "worldly"
activity: "To be in love," Haraway remarks, "means to be worldly, to be
in connection with significant otherness and signifying others, on many
scales, in layers of locals and globals, in ramifying webs. I want to
know how to live with the histories I am coming to know. Once one has
been in touch, obligations and possibilities for response change" (97).
The "becoming worldly" in Haraway’s discourse is, like Hardt and Negri’s
"biopolitics," rooted in a spiritualist ontology in which abstract,
transhistorical "life" is said to have "practical" consequences and
bring about new social forms and new material relations. However,
insofar as Hardt and Negri’s bio-political discourses draw from classic
Christian ontology the transspecies posthumanism advanced by Donna
Haraway and others, by contrast, is perhaps closer to the idealist
ontology of Hinduism manifested in such texts as The Bhagavad-Gita,
in which the divine is said not just to create but to
constitute the cosmos. Whereas in classic Christianity the divine
creates but is not itself contained in the material and sensuous world
or the cosmos, in ancient Hinduism the creator is the creation.
In The Bhagavad-Gita, for example, Krishna says to Arjuna "I
exist in all creatures" and "all creatures exist in me" (69, 85). In the
Gita, "all creatures"—in fact, all aspects of the sensuous and
material world, even inanimate and human-produced objects—are considered
to be "fragments of divine power" (91). The divine is thought to divide
itself—like a cell—into different entities creating the
appearance or "illusion" (Maya) of separateness when all,
according to this understanding, is actually a fragment of the
(same) divine absolute, the same spiritual force. In the Gita, historical differences between
"creatures" are dehistoricized and ideologically dissolved into a
spiritual life force. Historical and social life—that is, the life of
the individual or the species enabled by the ensemble of historical and
material relations—is represented as an epiphenomenon of an eternal
transcendent absolute spirit or spiritual "life force." In the Gita,
for example, Krishna says to Arjuna, "Just as the embodied self/ enters
childhood, youth and old age,/ so does it enter another body" (33). The
basis of material life according to the Gita is not the
historical or social life of the individual or even the historical life
of the species, it is a transhistorical and transmaterial absolute
spirit that goes through the eternal "cycle of many births" (33). The
"embodied self" in this translation of the Gita is a reference to
the Sanskrit concept of atman, what is roughly translated into
the "true," transcendent and abiding (and for lack of a better term)
"self." Unlike the Christian concept of the soul, or later Western
concepts of the "self," however, atman is not considered to be a
distinct individual soul or self. The seemingly individual soul (atman),
in this understanding, is indivisible from infinite spirit or the
"absolute" (Brahman). This is another way of saying that in this
narrative it is a transhistorical or divine "absolute" that is the "life
force" of the material and concrete world. Krishna continues: "Contacts
with matter make us feel/ heat and cold, pleasure and pain./ Arjuna, you
must learn to endure/ fleeting things—they come and go!" (33). Material
reality is seen as an epiphenomenon of the divine absolute: "Nothing of
non-being comes to be,/ nor does being cease to exist;/ the boundary
between these two is seen by men who see reality" (34). In the Gita, in other words, social history is
under-written by a spiritual trans-history and, as well, there is an "other-world"—a
spiritual and divine Being—that exists within and at the
same time enables the material and concrete world (i.e., the creator
is the creation). Moreover, the material contradictions,
differences, and the social inequalities that exist are understood as
epi-phenomena of a spiritual and other-worldly common infinity. All are
already part of this "other-world," the divine absolute is already in
existence, however, according to the Gita people suffer from "delusion"
and inaction and do not recognize their unity as fragments of the
divine. They become attached to the "illusion" (Maya) of Brahma—to
historical and concrete differences—and are "unaware" of their place in
the other-world or spiritual absolute. It is through this idealist ontology that the Gita
provides a spiritual resolution of material contradictions and, in doing
so, it ideologically legitimates social and economic inequality,
particularly caste. The Gita ideologically converts the caste
system and its economic and social inequalities which are the effect of
an historically produced and therefore transformable social division of
labor and production relations founded on exploitation into sacred
"difference" and affirms different "sacred duties" (dharma) on
earth in the name of "awareness" and "recognition" of one’s specific
"place" in the cosmos (i.e., as a "fragment" of a divine
absolute). "Awareness," or the evolved spiritual consciousness as it is
defined in the Gita means, "action" (karma) with
"detachment from the fruits of action" (38). More specifically, this
means performing one’s caste duty without questioning or focusing on the
material conditions or material consequences of action. This is, after
all, the basis upon which Krishna councils Arjuna to go to war with his
cousins, when Arjuna questions the historical and material consequences
of doing so, including the validity of killing his kinsmen for a
kingship. "Action with detachment to the fruits of one’s action" is
often read as a criticism of self-serving individualism—the Gita,
for instance, emphasizes "detachment" from the "concrete" self and, as
well, from material gain or the "fruits" of action. However, it is also
a rejection of social critique and collective material transformation
and an ideological legitimation of exploitation and the caste system. It
is important to note that the Bhagavad-Gita itself is an
historical document which is forged out of the history of class
relations. As the sixth book of the Mahabharata—or "the great
tale of the Bharata Dynasty"—its tales are part of the cultural
reproduction of the private property relations of the time. What is,
historically speaking, a brutal class war in which cousins are pitted
against each other to slaughter each other and protect the private
property holdings of competing dynasties, is represented in the Gita
as the "sacred field of battle." In the context of private property
relations and a caste-system which rests on private property, the
command to perform one’s duty but to remain detached from the "fruits"
of action is an ideological legitimation of exploitation. Moreover, the Gita, provides further
ideological resolution to material contradictions through the concept of
the "equal eye." In the Gita, the "aware person" and the person
of discipline see past duality to the common spiritual life force of
all: "Leaned men see with an equal eye/ a scholarly and dignified
priest, a cow, an elephant, a dog, and even an outcaste scavenger" (61).
While the Gita puts in suspension the possibility of material
transformation, in place of material equality it puts forward a
spiritual equality, the basis of which is "recognition" and seeing the
"common" spiritual life that unites all creatures: "Arming himself with
discipline,/ seeing everything with an equal eye,/ he sees the self in
all creatures/and all creatures in the self" (69). It is in this way
that the material relations of caste—for example, the division between
mental and manual labor—and, as well, the class relations of the time
(private ownership of the means of production) are ideologically
preserved in the name of spiritual recognition and equality. Trasspecies posthumanism advanced by Haraway and
others is an ideological updating of the ruling class ideology in The
Bhagavad-Gita. The ideological dissolution of historical differences
between species and the positing of an "omni-species" or a "transspecies"
in posthumanism is an updating of the Gita’s concept that "all
creatures" are "fragments" of the divine absolute. Moreover, like the
Gita’s concept of the "equal eye" which translates material
inequality into spiritual equality, Haraway’s argument for "transspecies
love" is an argument for the spiritual recognition of a "common"
life-force constituted by multiple differences, without social
transformation of the historical and material relations of exploitation
that bring about inequality. Just as the Gita is actually a form of
ruling class ideology, so is transspecies posthumanism. What is most
telling about the class politics of transspecies posthumanism is the way
it sentimentalizes and naturalizes the social and economic inequality
that arises from historical and social (and, therefore,
transformable) relations of production founded on the theft of
surplus labor (exploitation). At the core of Haraway’s concept of
"transspecies love" is what she calls "non-mimetic sharing,"
particularly "non-mimetic sharing" of suffering and pain: "Human beings’
learning to share other animals’ pain nonmimetically," Haraway remarks,
"is in my view, an ethical obligation, a practical problem, and an
ontological opening. Sharing pain promises disclosure, promises
becoming" (84). This concept naturalizes the class contradictions of
capitalism as a transhistorical and inevitable part of life as such.
More specifically, Haraway’s theory of "non-mimetic sharing of pain and
suffering" is based on the argument that in nature—in ecology for
example—there are unequal or what she calls "non-mimetic" relations of
use including the killing of some by others and, owing to this fact
there are no social relations that exist outside of "use" and "killing"
(73-82). The structural relations of production in which
use-values are produced through a process of exploitation and killing
occurs for profit are ideologically translated into a generalized
trans-history of the eternal and perpetual cycle of life, use, killing,
and death. This is not unlike the grounds upon which Krishna chastises
Arjuna for questioning why he should accept his position in the warrior
caste by going to war and killing his cousins. On the terms of the Gita,
while an individual soul (atman) might achieve transcendence (moksha)
and permanent dissolution into the divine absolute without being reborn,
there is no end to the cycle of samsara and even the divine cosmos
itself has its "day" and its "night"—its own cycle of samsara. However,
in some contrast with the Gita, Haraway’s argument is that humans
must more fully and physically feel the pain of this process
rather than detach from it, by involving themselves in the pain that is
endured by other animals. This, however, bypasses social relations and
restores what Roland Barthes criticized as the ideology of the "eternal
lyricism" of life which de-historicizes birth, death, rebirth, pain,
suffering, joy, and so on (Mythologies 100-102). Haraway puts the
question of transforming the mode of production in suspension. Her
argument distracts away from the necessity of collective social
transformation of historical and, therefore, transformable, class
relations and represents these structural relations as if they were
permanent features of life. By her logic since "using" and "killing"
exists in all modes of production because it exists in nature and the
question of private ownership of the means of production is irrelevant.
All we can do is the more "mundane" task of using ethically, killing
ethically within capitalism. It is on these terms that Haraway argues:
"Human beings must learn to kill responsibly. And to be killed
responsibly [...]" (81). "Non-mimetic sharing" is an argument for so
called "ethical" exploitation and so called "caring capitalism" whose
actual aim is to naturalize and legitimate the expansion of
transnational capitalism into all levels of existence. It is an argument
for "equality" in exploitation for the majority. As a figure for what she calls "non-mimetic" sharing
of suffering, Haraway discusses the fictional character Baba Joseph, who
is a lab worker in a scientific outpost in Zimbabwe in Nancy Farmer’s
novel A Girl Named Disaster. As a lab worker, Baba Joseph works
with guinea pigs who are being used as part of sleeping sickness
research to save the lives of humans and other animals. As part of this
research the guinea pigs are kept in wire cages, shaved and painted with
poisons and then exposed to tsetse flies who bite them and suck their
blood. In the course of the research Baba Joseph puts his unprotected
arm in the cages and, like the guinea pigs, his skin is extensively
bitten and swells up. His reasoning for this: "It is wicked to cause
pain, but if I share it, God may forgive me" (Farmer as qtd in Haraway
69). Significantly, what Haraway celebrates about the character of Baba
Joseph is that he does not resign from his job and lose his status in
the community, he does not try to convince a young girl, Nhamo, not to
work in the lab, and he does not consider freeing the guinea pigs or
tsetse flies (74). In other words, Haraway celebrates the fact that Baba
Joseph does not raise questions about the conditions in which he is
working, but subjects himself to physical pain and asks for forgiveness.
Even more significant is the unsaid of Haraway’s argument and its
postcolonial reason: Baba Joseph also, evidently, does not question the
relations that lead to his own exploitation in transnational capitalism.
He is, for all intents and purposes, a "good" worker of the global South
from the standpoint of transnational capital because he does his "duty,"
accepts the conditions of his exploitation in transnational capitalism,
helps to skill the next generation of workers in the same, and if that
were not enough he sees himself as the aggressor who must ask for
forgiveness. In this argument, all class contradictions are
translated from structural relations into matters of personal
responsibility, consent, and the "correctly" evolved moral and ethical
values. Toward this end Haraway argues: Sometimes, perhaps, "taking the place of the victim"
is a kind of action ethically required, but I do not think that is
sharing, and further those who suffer, including animals, are not
necessarily victims. What happens if we do not regard or treat lab
animals as victims, or as other to the human, or relate to their
suffering and deaths as sacrifice? What happens if experimental animals
are not mechanical substitutes but significantly unfree partners, whose
differences and similarities to human beings, to one another, and to
other organisms are crucial to the work of the lab and, indeed, are
partly constructed by the work of the lab? (72) Haraway’s concept of "significantly unfree
partners"—which is a species of her argument for non-mimetic
sharing—obscures the historical relations of production and the social
division of labor. On one level, as marked above, this concept puts
forward the idea that all are "significantly unfree" to transform social
relations and are bound to an "eternal lyricism" of life (of birth,
death, pain, love, joy). But, more significantly, Haraway deploys the
concept of "significantly unfree partners" to represent lab animals and
workers as having a "significant partnership" in the "unfreedom"
of their labor relations. Her argument that animals and lab-workers are
not "victims" but "partners" is by no means a "new" argument. Far from
moving beyond "anthropocentrism" this is a form of social contract
theory which argues that, at root, social relations are founded on
agreement and mutual consent. Haraway projects onto both animals
and exploited workers in labs consent to a global social division
of labor in capitalism that is founded on production for profit and the
exploitation of labor. Haraway contends that there are already
"degrees of freedom" within the existing social relations of
production. "Lab animals," she contends, "have many degrees of freedom
[...] including the inability of experiments to work if animals or other
organisms do not co-operate" (72-73). It is on this basis that Haraway
reads the height of alienation under private property
relations—what in colloquial terms is referred to as "losing the will to
live"—as a "degree of freedom" when she argues that: "Even factory meat
industries have to face the disaster of chickens’ or pigs’ refusal to
live when their co-operation is utterly disregarded in an excess of
human engineering arrogance" (73). Haraway substitutes moral outrage for explanatory
critique and social transformation and in doing so she uses the
sensationalizing and moralizing rhetoric of "factory meat industries" as
an "excess of human engineering arrogance" to detract attention away
from the fact that her theory is a most effective ally of transnational
capitalism. At every turn Haraway obstructs any serious examination and
critique of the structural relations of production—of production for
profit—and the way they determine and structure existing "relations of
use" between owners and workers, between the global North and the global
South, between humans and other animals, between humans and natural
resources: I resist the tendency to condemn all relations of
instrumentality between animals and people as necessarily involving
objectification and oppression of a kind similar to the objectifications
and oppressions of sexism, colonialism, and racism. I think in view of
the terrible similarities too much sway has been given to critique and
not enough to seeing what else is going on in instrumental human-animal
world makings and what else is needed. (74) By suspending social critique for sentimentality,
Haraway, echoing the Gita’s injunction against social critique,
ideologically converts the social division of labor founded on class
relations and production for the profit of a handful of owners into
"cosmic" duties. In Haraway’s narrative, the clinic-worker who
accompanies animals to be euthanized, the "good" lab worker who has his
hand eaten by tsetse flies without questioning the conditions of his own
exploitation, the North Atlantic dog owner who puts her depressed pet on
Prozac, etc. are all "fulfilling their ethical duty" to the cosmos and
performing a "daily service of love," while persons who critique
systemic relations of production and who argue for collective social
transformation are described as anthropocentric, speciesist, reactive,
lacking "response-ability" (69-93). Haraway formally distances her
theory of "cosmic responsibility"—what she calls cosmopolitics—from
the ideology of the Gita and other similar theories of divinity.
She claims that her concept of the cosmos "is the opposite of a place of
transcendent peace" (83). Haraway ostensibly rejects "transcendent
unity" for what she refers to as a more mundane, worldly, and ordinary
multiplicity and plurality. "The cosmos," she claims, "is the possible
unknown constructed by multiple, diverse entities " (83). However,
Haraway’s ostensible rejection of "unity" and "transcendence" is not so
much a break with the ideology of the Gita as it is an updating
of its class politics for the class relations of transnational
capitalism, which, in contrast to the private property relations
manifested in the ancient caste system, require flexibility of
contemporary workforces to be pulled in and out of different sectors of
the workforce depending on what is profitable to capital. Given the
Gita’s argument that a sacred duty (by which is actually meant caste
duty) is one’s place in the cosmos (i.e. and the cosmos is
the divine whole as far as the Gita is concerned), Haraway’s
concept of open "cosmic duty" is only a thin ideological updating of the
concept of a fixed "sacred duty" and its violent class politics—updated
for an era of "green capitalism" and the "greening" or
"bio-diversifying" of exploitation. Non-mimetic sharing, to put this another way, is a
euphemism for exploitation—for the theft of the surplus-labor of
workers by a handful of owners. Moreover, as a euphemism, it is deployed
to conceal and legitimate class relations. It is part of the ideology of
imperialism. "Non-mimetic sharing" is an ideology that erases the
relationship of difference and inequality around the world to the social
relations of production founded on private ownership of the means of
production and the theft of surplus-labor of workers around the world by
a handful of owners. It affirms class inequality as "cultural
difference" and erases that these differences are actually in
relation to social structures of exploitation. All differences are
relativized into a a post-difference hegemony of "transspecies
classlessness." According to this "transspecies classlessness," it is
the "ethical" obligation—the cosmic, sacred, or "ethically evolved"
duty—of the North Atlantic subject to give her dog prozac for depression
and gourmet dinners and to participate in the sport of fun agility
competitions in her leisure time and, by contrast, it is the cosmic duty
of the global worker of the South to have his unprotected flesh eaten by
tsetse flies to pay for the "sins" of science and mankind. This is
a legitimation of inequality which stems from private property relations
and the exploitation of humans by humans. It is the sine qua non
of what Franz Fanon so aptly critiqued in his title (and book) The
Wretched of the Earth, in which differences that are the result of
the social division of labor, the structural relations of exploitation
in capitalism—and the violent transfer of wealth from from the global
workforce to a handful of owners around the world—are represented as
"cosmic" duties or spiritual "callings" and, relative to the North
Atlantic subject, it is the worker of the global South whose "cosmic
duty" it is to do the most "non-mimetic sharing" of suffering. Transspecies posthumanism has become a way not to free
all species of animals from the excesses of the material contradictions
of capitalism and production for profit but the latest ruling class
strategy to dismantle struggles for social emancipation on the grounds
that they are violently "anthropocentric." Socialism, feminism,
anti-racism, the struggle against imperialism… in short, the great
struggles for human emancipation are said to be over because they are,
so the story goes, founded on what Haraway calls "the goad of human
exceptionalism" (46). References to animals and to the environment in
the discourses of transspecies posthumanism are on the one hand a
consequence of the fact that capitalism does, in fact, pollute the
environment and alienate and commodify the needs of all sentient beings,
by subordinating all species to production for profit. Yet, the
ideological abstraction of these problems from the capitalist mode of
production—from class relations and private ownership of the means of
production—is the means by which the ruling class ideologically sutures
a seemingly "transclass" "care" for the planet and all of its creatures
to its own class interests. However, the "transspecies" or "green" family under
capitalism is not an "evolutionary" break from capitalism or class
relations but is an historical index of the expansion of capitalism into
"green" products for the purpose of increasing profit. As global
capitalism comes into crisis its class contradictions break through the
surface and require new ideological legitimations that obscure the
material source of the contradictions lying in the exploitation of labor
in production. As the global economic crisis wears on, it has become
routine for spokespersons of global capitalism to ideologically renew
capital with a "green revolution," thus obscuring the exploitative
relations which alienate the needs of the majority for the profit of the
few. It is in this context that the discourses of transspecies
posthumanism have not only come of age, but have received widespread
institutional support. In the 21st century, the subordination
of all aspects of life on the planet to private property and production
for profit has reached new levels: from the private ownership of genes,
seeds, salt and entire species; to the industrialization and
overproduction of wheat, milk, and animal slaughter, which is left to
rot when it cannot be sold for a profit while people go starving; to
e-waste and toxic computer dumping in exploited nations. Posthumanism
represents the degradation of the environment as a cultural matter of "speciesism"
that requires a new cultural revolution based on a transspecies ethics
and thus obscures the class relations at the root of capitalism which
actually explain the drive for profit and its destructive social and
environmental consequences. By shifting the attention away from class
exploitation to unethical speciesist practices posthumanism puts forward
a vision of an ethical capitalism beyond capitalism, a capitalism that
is above all sustainable and in which class exploitation is naturalized
and taken to be the normal pattern of social organization. FOUR Biopolitics in general and transspecies posthumanism
in particular have become the norm in cultural theory because they
provide a cultural updating of the social relations of production in
capitalism that is in accord with new strategies in which capital seeks
to realize surplus-value through "green" technologies. The
greening of capitalism has become the new cultural horizon which
justifies exploitation under the pretext of getting in touch with
nature/the animal and the environment. More specifically, with the
ideological "greening" of capitalist production, this means that the
other which has been relegated to inhuman status—owing to the
exploitation of the other’s labor in production—is now discursively
aligned with the animal and is revalued as a (re)source for a more just
world or what Haraway calls "alter-globalization." This is a ruling
class ruse for sentimentalizing exploitation. What this
does is romanticize the poverty of the other which is not caused by
speciesist ideology but by wage-labor/capital relations. Transspecies posthumanism is ultimately a bypassing of
the social—and the need for social transformation to abolish the
exploitation of labor—and a return to a form of the "elemental" and the
"natural." To put this another way, posthumanism ideologically
normalizes the way in which wage-labor/capital relations, through the
exploitation of surplus-labor and the alienation of workers from the
social products of their collective labor, reduces what Marx calls
"species life" into "natural life" or a "mere means to individual
existence" (113). In his theory and critique of alienated labor in
The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Marx makes an
important distinction between "species life" and "natural life."
"Natural life" is the life of "eating, drinking, procreating…" in short,
of meeting immediate physical needs to reproduce individual life.
"Species-life," by contrast, is the life marked by conscious laboring
activity in which the human understands herself in historical and social
relations—as an historical being not simply a biological being—and for
whom the object of labor is not only one’s own immediate physical needs
but the historical life of the species—the material relations of their
production. Through the historical development of their collective
labor, humans are "species-beings" who have not simply developed the
ability to meet their immediate individual physical needs but have also
developed the ability to consciously and collectively transform their
historical and social relations of production. And yet, in capitalism, Marx argues, the objects of
production are torn from workers and confront the worker as forces alien
to them. This is because in capitalism people are divided by material
relations into two classes: those who own the means of production and
therefore exploit the surplus-labor of others and make profits from it
and the majority of others who own only their own labor and sell it for
wages, which they pay back to the owners of labor to buy the food,
medicine, houses, cars… they need to go back to work for the owners of
labor. This alienation of labor, moreover, is not simply an
alienation of the worker from the specific products she
produces—from the result of production—but is an alienation within "the
act of production, within producing activity itself." "The worker
therefore only feels herself outside of her work, and in her work feels
outside of herself. She is at home when she is not working and when she
is working she is not at home" (110). It is owing to the material relations of
production founded on private ownership of the means of production and
the theft of surplus-labor that workers are alienated and that
capitalism reduces the life of the species to "a mere means to her
existence" (113). "In tearing away from [workers] the objects of
[their] production," the alienation of labor "tears from [them] their
species-life." Class relations, Marx argues, "change […] the life of
the species into a means of individual life," and in doing so, the
alienation of labor under capitalism "makes individual life in its
abstract form the purpose of life of the species, likewise in the
abstract and estranged form" (112-113). The world historical questions
that enable people to direct their collective labor to build their world
consciously and collectively by means of social praxis are marginalized
and mere biological living ("individual life in the abstract") becomes
the main goal of life for the majority in class society structured by
exploitation. This is another way of saying that capitalism
reduces the majority "to work to live and live to work." Bio-politics more generally, and transspecies
posthumanism in particular, are theories of "passive adjustment" to the
ruins of capitalism. They spiritualize poverty and the subordination of
love, kinship, and sexual relations to commodity exchange relations and
production for profit. They reduce species life to a mere means of
individual survival within capitalism. This is a far cry from the
understanding of "love" produced by historical materialists such as
Kollontai who argued that the basis of the "hypocritical morality" of
capitalism is not in its failure to produce "ideal (post)human
beings"—what Haraway calls "companion species" or Hardt and Negri call
"new and different subjectivities"—rather it is in its material
relations of production. The hypocritical morality of capitalism is not
an effect a specific kind of "love" or "family" (these are its
symptoms and articulations) but rests on "the structure of
its exploitative economy" (Kollontai 263). Freedom of sexuality,
love, desire cannot be produced unless emotional relations are, as
Kollontai argues, "freed from financial considerations," which is to
say, freed from class society and its privatized relations of production
that produce dire economic necessity for the majority. This is not
simply a matter of "meeting individual needs" for the reproduction of
capitalism. Rather, it requires freedom from necessity. Freedom,
that is, from social relations of production based on the exploitation
of labor which, if left intact, will inevitably subordinate human
relations including love and sexual relations to "financial
considerations." "Love"—of animals, of people, of differences, of the
world—does not evolve or transcend beyond capitalism without the
material transformation of capitalist relations of production. Rather,
it is in dialectical relation to the material relations of production in
society. "Love" can only be "freed" if it is freed from class society
and its privatized relations of production that subordinate the planet
to production for profit while producing dire economic necessity for the
majority. For an emancipatory theory of love what is needed is a return
to grasping the class relations that structure life under capitalism and
understanding that ending alienation requires bringing about social
relations of production in which class antagonisms have not only already
been abolished—because private property has been abolished—but have
been, as Engels puts it, "forgotten in practical life" (Anti-Dühring
119). Works Cited: Agamben, Giorgio. The Coming Community. Trans. Michael Hardt.
Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1993. Print. ---. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazan. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1998. Print. ---. Means Without End. Trans. Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare
Casarino. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1996. Print. Augustine. Confessions. Trans. R.S. Pine-Coffin. London: Penguin, 1961. Print. Barthes, Roland. Mythologies. Trans. Annette Lavers. New York:
Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1972. Print. The Bhagavad-Gita. Trans. Barbara Stoler Miller. New York: Bantam Classics, 1986. Print. Cerni, Paula. "Imperialism in the Twenty-First Century." Theory &
Science (2006). Web. 26 December 2007. Corsani, Antonella. "Beyond the Myth of Woman: The Becoming-Transfeminist
of (Post)Marxism." SubStance 112, 36.1 (2007). 107-138. Print. Eagleton, Terry. Literary Theory: An Introduction. Second Edition.
Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1996. Print. Engels, Frederick. Anti-Dühring. Peking: Foreign
Languages Press, 1976. Print. Engels, Frederick. The Dialectics of Nature. Moscow: Progress
Publishers, 1972. Print. Foucault, Michel. The History of Sexuality, vol 1. Trans.
Robert Hurley. New York: Vintage, 1978. Print. Haraway, Donna. When Species Meet. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota
P, 2008. Print. Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri. Commonwealth. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2009. Print. Kollontai, Alexandra. Selected Writings. Trans. Alix Holt. New York: Norton, 1977. Print. Lewontin, Richard and Richard Levins. Biology Under the Influence.
New York: Monthly Review Press, 2007. Print. Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels. The German Ideology. Moscow:
Progress Publishers, 1976. Print. Marx, Karl. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Vol. 1.
Trans. Ben Fowkes. London: Penguin Books, 1976. Print. ---. "A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right:
Introduction." Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right'. Trans.
Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1970. Print. ---. Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Trans.
Martin Milligan. New York: International Publishers, 1964. Print. Plato. Five Great Dialogues. Trans. B. Jowett. New York:
Walter J. Black, 1942. Print. Roesch, Jen. "Turning Back the Clock? Women, Work, and the Family
Today." International Socialist Journal 38 (Nov-Dec 2004). Web. 6
October 2010. Wade, Nicholas. "New finding Puts Origins of Dogs in the Middle East"
The New York Times, March 17, 2010. Web. 26 November 2011. |
THE RED CRITIQUE 14 (Winter/Spring 2012)
REDCRITIQUE.ORG
Back